University of North Carolina School of Law

Carolina Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2010

Revolution in Pragmatist Clothing: Nationalizing Workplace Law
Jeffrey M. Hirsch
University of North Carolina School of Law, jmhirsch@email.unc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Publication: Alabama Law Review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

File: HIRSCH EIC PUBLISH.doc

Created on: 12/6/2010 2:25:00 PM

Last Printed: 12/6/2010 3:28:00 PM

REVOLUTION IN PRAGMATIST CLOTHING:
NATIONALIZING WORKPLACE LAW
Jeffrey M. Hirsch*
ABSTRACT
Workplace governance in the United States consists of a fragmented
system of rules emanating from federal, state, and local governments. This
fragmentation creates an unnecessarily inefficient and suboptimal system
of regulation that often makes workplace protection little more than a false
promise for workers. Ironically, these problems are at least partially the
result of too many disparate rules. Thus, a reduction in the number of
workplace protections could improve the effectiveness of the system as a
whole. Achieving that goal requires a solution that reflects the magnitude
of the problem; tinkering at the margins will accomplish little. Accordingly, this Article proposes a revolutionary reform: the nationalization of
workplace law. The modern, global economy no longer justifies local control over the workplace, especially given the problems with our current
federalist model of regulation. Moreover, the federal government’s structural advantages give it the best opportunity to push workplace law towards a more optimal level. Exclusive federal regulation will also allow
for significant streamlining and simplification. These changes will increase
the effectiveness of workplace laws and allow more workers to enjoy the
protections that these laws promise.
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INTRODUCTION
Problems with our labor and employment (“workplace”) laws have
prompted an avalanche of reform proposals over the years. The 2008 election gave such proposals more prominence, as the political feasibility of
substantial workplace reform appeared higher than it had in decades. Yet,
a question remains whether these proposals—even if enacted—are a waste
of time. Reform proposals typically address a relatively narrow problem
while ignoring the significant shortcomings of the workplace regulatory
system as a whole. Without addressing these fundamental problems, even
the best reforms will have little impact. Thus, this Article argues that our
primary focus should be to strengthen the workplace regulatory system
itself, making both existing and new laws more effective. In particular, the
Article proposes a radical reform aimed at eliminating much of the complexity and inefficiency in our current system—a reform that would nationalize workplace law.
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Workers in the United States possess a multitude of rights, at least in
theory. Prohibitions against discrimination and retaliation, protections for
whistleblowers and collective activity, and guarantees of certain wages or
safety measures are but a few of the many rights that workers are supposed to enjoy. For many workers, however, these rights are illusory.
Despite literally hundreds of different workplace protections emanating
from federal, state, and local governments, their impact on the workplace
is questionable. The irony is that it may be the sheer number and sources
of these rights that are undermining workers’ ability to benefit from them.
Numerous critics have argued that American workplace rules fail to
achieve many of their goals.1 This failure underscores the suboptimal nature of our workplace regulatory system; that is, a system in which
changes could be made that would increase social welfare without imposing more costs than benefits.2 One of the hallmark workplace protections—
the prohibition against discrimination based on race, sex, color, national
origin, and religion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII)3—provides an excellent example. Evidence shows that Title VII has
reduced workplace discrimination far less than intended.4 Although there
are several reasons for Title VII’s shortcomings, the decentralized and
fragmented nature of the workplace regulatory system itself is a substantial
impediment to Title VII’s antidiscrimination goals.
The workplace regulatory system has developed incrementally, as various levels of government have enacted new laws with little consideration
for how they will work in practice. That our federalist regime has created
a patchwork of overly complicated laws should come as no surprise. What
is a surprise, however, is that few have questioned whether this state of
affairs makes sense for workplace regulation.
The answer, according to this Article, is no—at least not in the current
economy. Although state governance of the workplace made sense at one
point in our history, that time has long passed.5 The modern economy is
global in scale, and our workplace laws should reflect that reality. Instead
of acting as if workplace regulations affect only isolated, local labor mar1.
See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a RightsClaiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1448–90
(1996).
2.
See infra Part II.A.
3.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
4.
See supra note 1; Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth is Out There: Revamping Federal Antidiscrimination Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193 (2009);
Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination
Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2003).
5.
But see William A. Herbert, No Direction Home: Will the Law Keep Pace with Human Tracking Technology to Protect Individual Privacy and Stop Geoslavery?, 2 J.L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO.
SOC’Y 409, 455–66, 470 (2006) (arguing that states have been more responsive to privacy concerns
related to new technologies).
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kets, we should seek a more comprehensive and centralized regulation of
our national labor market. Indeed, given the severe problems associated
with our fragmented workplace regulatory system, we should nationalize
workplace law, making the federal government the exclusive source of
regulation. The federal government is in a better position than the states to
promote our competiveness in the global labor market and place our national interests over parochial ones. In short, rather than continuing to
view the workplace as it used to exist, we should instead recognize that the
federal government is the best entity to regulate the workplace as it now
exists.
Proponents of federalism argue that it promises superior policymaking
and protection for individual liberties. Although that promise may be fulfilled in some areas, it has fallen far short in the workplace. In contrast,
centralized governance, while not perfect, is in a better position to maximize social welfare by developing a cohesive body of workplace regulations
that actually deliver on their promises to workers.
Centralized control of the workplace is also likely to enhance substantive protections for the average worker. Although workers in a small
handful of employee-friendly states would see a decrease in the number of
their workplace rights, all United States workers would achieve gains as
the remaining protections would become more effective. Additionally, a
federal government with exclusive authority would likely enact more
workplace protections than it does today.
Workplace rights that are part of a centralized structure would also
avoid many of the complexities that undermine the effectiveness of our
current system of governance. A nationalized workplace system would be
easier for parties to understand; would minimize the number of workplace
rules; would better integrate the rules that did exist; and would decrease
the number of suits that involve different forums, different substantive and
procedural standards, and different coverage rules. These improvements
would make our workplace laws more effective and bring them closer to
the socially optimal level.
To be sure, shifting to a centralized regime would be revolutionary
and not without costs; yet, the potential benefits of such a move make it
worth exploring. Other countries have nationalized workplace governance6
and, although such comparisons are not perfect, they suggest that nationalizing United States workplace law may not be as risky as it appears from
the American perspective. Indeed, countries with nationalized workplace
6.
See, e.g., LILIANE JUNG, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, NATIONAL LABOUR LAW
PROFILE: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2001), http:// www.ilo.org/ public/ english/ dialogue/
ifpdial/ info/ national/ ger.htm (noting Germany, which allows for state workplace regulation, is
largely nationalized in practice); LILIANE JUNG, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, NATIONAL
LABOUR LAW PROFILE: JAPAN (2001), http:// www.ilo.org/ public/ english/ dialogue/ ifpdial/info/
national/jp.htm.
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governance—virtually all industrialized nations—have much greater protections for workers than the United States does.7 That difference cannot
be explained solely by federalism, but it shows that our system has not
been a great boon to workers. Thus, suggestions that nationalizing American workplace law would harm workers8 are exaggerated and possibly
backward.
Arguments in favor of keeping or expanding the role of the states9 in
the workplace are especially perplexing given the undeniable problems
with our current regulatory system. If the argument to nationalize
workplace law was a radical proposal to improve an already successful
system, opposition would be understandable. However, resisting change
because of a reluctance to break away from a failed system is much harder
to countenance. Nationalizing workplace law could easily fail, but given
the problems of the current system, is it not worth considering?
Finally, the radical nature of the proposal to nationalize all workplace
regulations is intentional. Workplace law has significant problems; thus,
equally significant reforms are warranted. However, even if one objects to
nationalization, the hope is that this proposal will at least spur discussion
about the failures of our current system of workplace regulations and how
to address them. There should be little dispute that this system could be
drastically improved by reducing the inconsistencies among federal and
state regulations, by making rules easier to understand, and by streamlining enforcement. Other reforms could also be part of the mix, but only if
they reflect the severity of the problems currently plaguing workplace law.
Part I of this Article examines the need for a new, more holistic approach to workplace regulation, described as “regulatory pragmatism.”
Part II employs this regulatory approach by providing a pragmatic critique
of existing workplace laws, particularly the excessive level of complexity
that hinders enforcement of those laws. Finally, Part III proposes a broad,
pragmatic solution—nationalizing workplace law—that would create a
more optimal level of regulation by centralizing and simplifying workplace
governance.
I. REGULATORY PRAGMATISM
Policymaking (much like legal scholarship) often focuses on theory far
more than actual practice. “Regulatory pragmatism” is a system of regulatory governance that attempts to reverse that approach by shifting policy7.
See supra note 6.
8.
See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Workplace Federalism: The Ironic Necessity for State Protection
of Workers, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 29 (2009).
9.
Local governments may have their own laws; however, for the sake of simplicity, “state” will
be used to denote state and local governments unless noted otherwise.
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makers’ focus to the practical effects of their rules. Although theory is
important, regulatory pragmatism—taking cues from legal pragmatism’s
approach to judicial interpretations—promotes the idea that policymakers
should consider foremost the impact of their decisions.10 This calculus
depends less on an overarching philosophy of regulation than a reliance on
disciplines such as economics, sociology, and psychology to better predict
a rule’s ability to achieve desired results.
A concern for pragmatism is not new, as the beginnings of the American legal pragmatism movement arose in the latter part of the nineteenth
century.11 This philosophy pushed for a contextual approach to regulation
that would develop theories from practical experiences.12 Gone would be
the days where regulators began with theory in an attempt to address a
problem; instead, pragmatist policymakers would examine various problems and attempts to solve them—and only then build a theory.13 Currently, the dominant strain of this philosophy is “legal pragmatism,” which
centers on judges’ role in interpreting law. Judge Richard Posner is the
most prominent jurist who adheres to this type of decision making, and his
opinions often exhibit the practical concerns that legal pragmatism encourages.14
According to Professor Daniel Farber, legal pragmatism “essentially
means solving legal problems using every tool that comes to hand, including precedent, tradition, legal text, and social policy . . . .”15 Pragmatism
emphasizes context and the development of rules based on experience.16
Yet, defining legal pragmatism may be best explained by describing what
it is not.
Farber depicts legal pragmatism as part of a broader attack against
constitutional “foundationalism,” which he defines as a search for a unifying principle upon which judicial decisions are based.17 The problems with
this approach include the creation of theories that are too abstract to decide
10.
See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 15–16 (2003); Alexander Tsesis, Toward a Just Immigration Policy: Putting
Ethics into Immigration Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 105, 139–40 (1999) (arguing for pragmatic immigration legislation that “consider[s] the foreseeable extent to which laws can improve the welfare of
society”).
11.
See Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1337
(1988).
12.
SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 10, at 15–16; JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE
(1971).
13.
J.B. Ruhl, Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist) Middle in Environmental Law, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 532 (2000) (book review).
14.
Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 5 (1996); see also O.W.
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”).
15.
Farber, supra note 11, at 1332.
16.
Id. at 1335 & n.23, 1432 (citing Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 28–29 (1986)).
17.
Id. at 1334–35 & nn.17–22.
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particular cases, inconsistent outcomes that occur when judges follow different theories, decisions that fail to gain respect from society, and the
inability to adjust to changes in society.18 Pragmatism, by contrast, is nonfoundational. It recognizes the difficulties presented in the law and promotes incremental decisions that look to past experience, changes in society, and the diversity of views in society.19 An important feature of legal
pragmatism is its focus on the social impact of a decision.20 Rather than
holdings based solely on the dictates of a judge’s grand theory, a pragmatic decision would take into account the effects of a case’s potential outcome.
The ideas underpinning legal pragmatism extend beyond judicial decision making, or at least they should. Policymakers also should avoid adhering to a grand theory of regulation without attempting first to ground it
in reality. This reality checking should be a continuous process. After the
initial promulgation of a regulation, repeatedly examining its effects would
provide the best measures of success in most instances. These examinations should be the basis for future regulation, whether through an entirely
new scheme or an amendment to the incumbent system.21
Although it seems obvious that an effective regulation must actually
achieve its goals,22 that aim is often the exception rather than the rule.
Workplace law is a prime example of this problem. The complex and multifaceted system of federal and state laws has produced an inconsistent and
ineffective workplace governance regime. A pragmatic approach to
workplace law would take into account these enforcement problems and
seek reforms that would better fulfill the policy goals of the current system.23

18.
Id. at 1340–41.
19.
Id. at 1342–43. Farber describes the basic question of pragmatic judicial decision making as
whether an idea “works, whether it produces better results for society.” Id. at 1353.
20.
Id. at 1343.
21.
Environmental law scholars, in particular, have stressed the need for pragmatic approaches to
regulation, such as pollution permit trading schemes that promise greater reductions in pollution at a
lower cost to regulated entities. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Note, Emissions Allowance Trading Under the
Clean Air Act: A Model for Future Environmental Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 352 (1999);
see also Ruhl, supra note 13, at 532 (describing environmental pragmatism as considering economic
and social change, realities of nature, future consequences of decisions, and need to adapt decisionmaking processes).
22.
See GUNNAR MYRDAL, BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE 93 (1960) (stating that industrialized
economies should constantly attempt to simplify regulation and try to make them more effective).
23.
David Weil, Crafting a Progressive Workplace Regulatory Policy: Why Enforcement Matters,
28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 125 (2007); Michael J. Zimmer, Book Review, 21 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 249, 250, 260 (2000) (reviewing BOB HEPPLE, ET AL., EQUALITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK—
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF U.K. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
LEGISLATION (2000) and complementing U.K. study for examining how laws actually work).
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II. A PRAGMATIC CRITIQUE OF WORKPLACE LAW
A. Optimal Level of Regulation
The ultimate goal of workplace governance should be the achievement
of an optimal level of regulation. Defining “optimal” is easier said than
done, as determining what goals should be achieved and how to quantify
them is difficult, if not impossible. However, we can describe certain characteristics by which current and proposed regulations may be measured.
An optimal level of regulation can be characterized in economic terms
as the amount of regulation that maximizes overall societal welfare. This
maximization point turns on whether the level of regulation is considered
economically efficient. Under “Kaldor-Hicks” efficiency, the economically efficient level occurs when no change can be made that would provide
more benefits to society than costs—essentially a utilitarian model.24 Accordingly, an optimal level of workplace regulation is one in which no
changes exist that would satisfy this cost-benefit analysis.25
Regulatory systems can deviate from this efficiency goal in at least
two ways: either too much regulation or not enough. This concept of “too
much” or “too little” implicates both the substance and the quantity of
regulations. For example, a workplace regulatory system will be at a suboptimal level if it could enhance social welfare by increasing the number
of protections for workers or by making existing protections more expansive. These changes would provide benefits to workers and the rest of
society that exceeded whatever additional costs they placed on businesses
and the economy. In turn, a system could have protections that are too
great in number or that impose too many requirements. In this system, the
benefits to workers are less than the costs of the regulations, suggesting
that a decrease in protection would move closer to the optimal level of
workplace regulation.
Identifying the optimal level of workplace regulation is far more difficult than describing it. Accurately calculating the costs and benefits of
workplace laws is not feasible; the benefits, in particular, often involve
unquantifiable measures of utility to workers and others in society.
The substantive coverage of workplace laws exemplifies this measurement problem, as the effects of such laws are very difficult to iso24.
In other words, an alternative is considered more efficient than the status quo if the winners
under the alternative would be willing to compensate the losers. Daniel A. Farber, What (If Anything)
Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1791, 1795 (2003). Another definition is
Pareto efficiency, which states that the economically efficient point is where no changes can be made
without making someone worse off. See Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2007).
25.
An optimal level of regulation can also be defined as the “point at which the marginal cost of
a unit of regulation equals the marginal benefit for individuals within that jurisdiction.” John O.
McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 907–08 (2001).

File: HIRSCH EIC PUBLISH.doc

2010]

Created on: 12/6/2010 2:25:00 PM

Last Printed: 12/6/2010 3:28:00 PM

Revolution in Pragmatist Clothing

1033

late.26 Many have argued both for27 and against28 protections for workers
and this disagreement could be framed as a search for the optimal level of
substantive workplace regulation. Although in comparison to other countries it appears that the United States has too few protections for workers,
there is no robust empirical support for either position. Yet, this issue
need not be resolved to see that nationalizing workplace law provides the
best opportunity to achieve an optimal level of regulation. Success, even if
measurable, is not guaranteed. However, as described in more detail below,29 the federal government—although far from perfect30—is better
equipped than the states to take into account the national economy, employer and employee interests, and overall societal welfare. Moreover,
exclusive federal control would allow both employer and employee advocates to influence policy debates, thereby increasing the chance of more
balanced policy outcomes.
In addition to their substance, the quantity of workplace laws also appears to be suboptimal. As the subsequent discussion illustrates,31 problems caused by the surfeit of workplace rules are more readily observed
than issues with their substance. Our federalist regulatory system consists
of concurrent, and often duplicative, federal and state laws, enacted with
little consideration of how they work together. The result is a confusing
patchwork of rules that make enforcement and compliance difficult—the
costs appear to be greater than whatever benefits are associated with this
system. A more optimal approach would be to reduce the number of laws
and make them part of a more coherent whole.
Take, for example, discrimination law. If we assume that existing
substantive antidiscrimination protections are optimal, we should explore
the best way to enforce those protections. Should we have federal and state
governments pass their own laws, many of which have somewhat different
coverage, definitions, remedies, and tribunals? Or should we instead use a
single, centralized governance system that creates a more holistic set of
rules and can be adjudicated in a single forum? This Article argues that the
latter system is far more likely to accomplish its goals than the former.32
26.
The most work in this area has involved whether an at will or just cause default for terminations is more economically efficient. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will,
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 951 (1984); Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation
in the United States, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 644, 645–46 (1991); Andrew P. Morriss, Bad
Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901,
1903 (1996); J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts:
Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 842.
27.
See supra note 1.
28.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (Harvard University Press 1995) (1992).
29.
See infra Part III.B.
30.
Weil, supra note 23, at 132–33.
31.
See infra Part II.B.
32.
It is true that the number of laws could become suboptimally low. The situation is similar to
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B. Suboptimal Workplace Regulation and the Effect on Compliance and
Enforcement
Although reasonable arguments can be made as to the most appropriate level of protection for workers, there are few defenses for the fragmented structure of today’s workplace regulatory system. As early as
1972, Professor Charles Morris described the system of workplace laws at
that time as “one of confusion and frustration. It is a picture of inefficient
administration and inadequate compliance; a jurisdictional nightmare of
overlapping and conflicting decisions. There exists a tableau of neverending campaigns to achieve accommodation among separate tribunals
with related but different areas of interest.”33 That picture has only grown
worse in the succeeding years. The number of workplace laws has increased significantly since 1972, and with these new laws have come new
compliance and enforcement burdens that affect employers, employees,
and judges. Although it is difficult to quantify these costs,34 workplace
litigation is replete with examples of complex legal schemes creating inefficiencies and barriers to enforcement. In short, the overabundance of
workplace laws has created a suboptimal level of regulation. This problem
is substantial and thereby warrants equally substantial reforms—reforms
that would bring our workplace regulatory system closer to its optimal
level by drastically simplifying and streamlining protections for workers.
Ironically, the problems with our current system may come to the fore
by examining a group often ignored in debates over workplace reform:
employers. In the United States, over two hundred different federal laws
govern employers’ relationship with their workers.35 State workplace laws
add to those requirements, particularly for employers with workers in multiple jurisdictions.36 A further layer of complexity results from each state’s
the Laffer Curve, which states that there is an optimal level of taxation and having either too low or
too high taxes will create a suboptimal amount of revenue. See generally James M. Buchanan &
Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Time, and The Laffer Curve, 90 J. POL. ECON. 816 (1982). Given our current plethora of workplace laws, it is unlikely that there is a risk of too few laws in a given area.
33.
Charles J. Morris, The Case for Unitary Enforcement of Federal Labor Law—Concerning a
Specialized Article III Court and the Reorganization of Existing Agencies, 26 SW. L.J. 471, 495
(1972); see also Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1462–63 (1971).
34.
One compliance study found that companies’ lack of knowledge about toxic chemical reporting
requirements caused a significant portion of the noncompliance with those requirements—even more
than the costs of compliance. John Brehm & James T. Hamilton, Noncompliance in Environmental
Reporting: Are Violators Ignorant, or Evasive, of the Law?, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 444, 467 (1996).
35.
Statutes in addition to those described in this Article include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2006) (protecting corporate whistleblowers); Employee Polygraph Protection Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 2001–2009 (2006) (restricting use of polygraphs); Workers’ Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act (WARN), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109 (2006) (requiring notice before major layoffs and
plant closures).
36.
States often have statutes similar to federal laws, particularly antidiscrimination employment
laws; despite their similar goals, however, the laws are often quite different. Jarod S. Gonzales, State
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distinct common-law doctrines governing the employment relationship.37
The different substantive requirements of these laws create compliance
burdens because employers must determine which rules apply and how to
satisfy the ones that do.38 The result is that even well-intentioned employers have an extremely difficult task in making their workplaces fully compliant.39
This problem is not merely a concern for employers, however. Employees and the public must also be wary because compliance difficulties
directly impact the effectiveness of workplace protections. High compliance costs make employers unable or unwilling to fulfill their legal obligations,40 meaning that workplace laws will have little value to the employees they were designed to protect or to the policies they were intended
to promote.
Complexity generates additional inefficiencies. For instance, a complicated system of workplace laws puts employees—who are generally ignorant of even their most basic rights—at a serious informational disadvantage. The ability of employees to exert or trade their rights efficiently requires accurate information, as well as relatively costless enforcement and
bargaining mechanisms.41 More important, because most workplace laws
depend on private rights of action, this informational problem creates substantial barriers to enforcement.42 In short, as the system of workplace
Antidiscrimination Statutes and Implied Preemption of Common Law Torts: Valuing the Common Law,
59 S.C. L. REV. 115, 116–20 (2007); Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”:
Divergent Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV.
469, 473–77 (2006).
37.
See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (implied contract);
Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) (covenant of good faith and fair
dealing); Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (public policy tort).
38.
Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 164, 170 (2007) (stating that “parties increasingly find themselves
subject to conflicting obligations” under the “possibility of multiple or alternative claims drawn from
across the boundaries of the conventional work law subjects”); Paul C. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 194 (2001) (“[C]osts
incurred by companies . . . to comply with more and more detailed employment regulations are several times the cost of litigation and insurance when companies are sued.”); Jana E. Cuellar, Comment,
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Handling the Element of Intent in Summary Judgment
Motions, 38 EMORY L.J. 523, 551 & n.180 (1989) (noting compliance difficulties).
39.
Cf. David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational
Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 931 (2001) (“In a recent survey of corporate environmental managers, nearly half reported that their most time-and energy-consuming duty is
trying to determine whether their companies are in compliance with the law, with seventy percent
believing perfect compliance is impossible.”).
40.
David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of
Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59, 62 (2005).
41.
Krueger, supra note 26, at 645–46.
42.
Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1655, 1673 (1996). Attempts to improve employer self-compliance also require effective channels of
information. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 319, 378 (2005).
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rights becomes more cumbersome and difficult to understand, those rights
become less effective.
1. A Brief History of American Workplace Law
The fragmented nature of today’s workplace regulations can be traced
to the development of workplace governance itself. As the typical
workplace transformed from a small, familial relationship to a larger,
more impersonal setting, the laws governing work changed also. The shift
in the type of work that dominated the economy was accompanied by a
significant increase in workplace regulations. Yet, because these rules
were often reactions to newly appreciated problems, they were enacted
with little thought about how they fit together.
The modern conception of employment as a contractual relationship is
a relatively recent idea. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, work was largely performed on a very small scale.43 These small agricultural or commercial entities typically had only a couple of workers and were largely governed as a familial master-servant relationship.44 The duties that both the
master and servant owed the other were characterized more by public policy than by contract.45
This situation changed with the onset of the Industrial Revolution and
its larger, mechanized workplaces. The familial relationship broke down
as the number of workers at a given location expanded dramatically.46
Increased competition meant that employers chafed at their duty to keep
workers employed for a certain amount of time.47 Employees, in turn,
reacted to their new, harsher workplaces by using more collective activity
to seek better working conditions.48 At the same time, American courts
began embracing the concept of individuals’ freedom of contract, which
was ultimately embodied in the employment “at will” rule—a doctrine that
permits either party to end the employment relationship for any or no reason.49 This doctrine spread rapidly from the late 1800s until it was the
43.
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.03, at 9 (2007);
CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1993).
44.
PERRITT, supra note 43, § 1.03, at 9 (citing PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND
INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 123–24 (1969)); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1824 (1980) [hereinafter
Note, Protecting At Will Employees]; Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the
Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510,
1513 (1980)).
45.
PERRITT, supra note 43, § 1.03, at 9–10
46.
Id. at 11.
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 11–12; Matthew W. Finkin, Shoring Up the Citadel (At-Will Employment), 24 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 24–25 (2006) (describing employment law transformation as population became
more industrial).
49.
Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (Tenn. 1884), overruled on other grounds,
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default in virtually every state by the 1930s.50 Much of the modern era of
employment law may be viewed as the development of exceptions to the
at-will rule, which remains the default in all but one state.51
The initial growth in these workplace regulations occurred largely
through federal action and judicial opinions dealing with union activity;
for the most part, states became involved much later.52 Many of the early
workplace protections involved federal employees.53 For instance, the
1883 Pendleton Act tore down the patronage system by, among other
things, requiring merit-based hiring.54 It was not until 1912, however, that
the federal workplace abandoned the at-will rule by permitting terminations only for “just cause.”55 These civil service protections were strengthened by various measures over the next several decades.56
The federal government, with some states joining in, also began regulating collective activity—albeit with initial resistance from the courts. In
the early 1900s, the Supreme Court held that various federal and state
statutes which prohibited discrimination based on an employee’s union
status unconstitutionally interfered with employers’ and employees’ right
to freedom of contract.57 This line of reasoning, however, was not limited
to cases involving collective activity. Indeed, many of the Court’s repeated
rejections of New Deal legislation in the 1930s involved workplace regulations, such as those setting work conditions and maximum work hours.58
During this period, the Court’s holdings left states with a larger role in
regulating the workplace, which they exercised sparingly.59 Federal
workplace legislation again became prominent once the Court finally
changed course, a change that occurred in 1937 through its approval of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),60 which created a broad federal
governance of collective activity that preempted most state regulation.
Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915); Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law
at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 356 (2002).
50.
Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment as an Interjurisdictional Race
to the Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV. 453 (2008); Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L.
REV. 679, 700 (1994).
51.
Montana has enacted a statute prohibiting most terminations that are not made without “good
cause.” Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -915 (1987).
52.
TOMLINS, supra note 43, at 372–81 (describing rare early state cases awarding damages for
workplace injuries).
53.
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 381–86 (1983) (describing early federal employment reforms).
54.
Pendleton Act, 22 Stat. 403 (1883).
55.
Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 37 Stat. 539, 555 § 6 (1912).
56.
Bush, 462 U.S. at 385–86; Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 44, at 1619–68.
57.
See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), overruled in part by
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
58.
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935).
59.
For example, fifteen states had created minimum wage protections by 1929. Bok, supra note
33, at 1422.
60.
29 U.S.C. §§ 150–169 (2006); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
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Later, prohibitions against workplace discrimination began to appear.
With few exceptions,61 the federal government again led the way through
various laws and executive orders,62 finally culminating in the landmark
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.63 States did not entirely stand on
the sidelines, however. Although the federal government implemented the
initial measures, over half of the states had some form of antidiscrimination legislation by the time of Title VII’s passage.64
Finally, in the latter half of the twentieth century, state common law
began establishing exceptions to the at-will default. Although a few cases
decades earlier had provided damages for terminations,65 it was not until
the 1970s that states began establishing recognized causes of action for
employees who would otherwise be unprotected by the at-will rule. These
causes of action included the contract-based theories of implied job protection66 and the duty of good faith and fair dealing.67 To a lesser extent,
states also allowed tort claims in certain circumstances, particularly under
a theory that the employer acted contrary to public policy.68
Although states have helped develop workplace law,69 the federal government has often taken the leading role. The federal government’s early
initiative on workplace issues is particularly notable given questions surrounding its ability to regulate the workplace now. This history also undermines the argument that state authority over the workplace is necessary
to allow for experimentation and development of workplace laws.70 Indeed, as illustrated below, concurrent federal and state governance has led
to a near dysfunctional enforcement system that leaves workers with more
empty promises than actual protections.
2. Multiple Claims and Standards
One of the principal shortcomings of today’s workplace laws is the
multifaceted nature of adjudications. The expansion of the number of
(upholding NLRA’s constitutionality).
61.
See N.Y. EDUC. LAW. § 569 (1924) (prohibiting sex-based pay discrimination for teachers).
62.
See, e.g., Unemployment Relief Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 22 (1933); Exec. Order No. 8802, 6
Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 25, 1941) (prohibiting discrimination by war contractors); Exec. Order No.
8587, 5 Fed. Reg. 4445 (Nov. 7, 1940) (prohibiting discrimination in federal civil service).
63.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
64.
PERRITT, supra note 43, § 10.05, at 19.
65.
See supra note 52.
66.
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
67.
Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
68.
Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (awarding tort damages to employee fired for serving on jury duty). But see Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983) (refusing
to recognize public policy tort). Some earlier courts treated public policy claims as contract-based. See
generally Petermann v. Local 396, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
69.
For example, President Roosevelt looked to New York’s workplace regulations when establishing New Deal policies. See FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW (1946).
70.
See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
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claims and substantive standards necessary to resolve a workplace dispute
has created a similar increase in the cost of compliance and enforcement.
This represents a suboptimal level of regulation, as there are reforms that
could achieve the same, or more, protections for workers with far fewer
compliance and enforcement costs.
Employers again provide a useful vantage. As the number of laws governing the workplace has increased, the burden on employers has increased as well. Each new law is accompanied by a new set of rules, legal
standards, and court interpretations. Even when a law is similar to an existing one, employers—as well as employees—must be mindful of their
frequently disparate requirements.71 This burden is important, for it directly affects employers’ ability and willingness to comply with those laws. If
employers fail to achieve a significant degree of compliance, the purposes
of those laws are left unfulfilled. Moreover, as Professor Clyde Summers
once warned, increasing the number of workplace rights tends to “hold out
promises to the employee, harass and impoverish the employer, enrich the
lawyers, and clog the legal machinery.”72 Subsequent years have proven
him correct.
The myriad of claims and standards that may apply to a given set of
facts have a significant impact on the enforcement of workplace rights. An
isolated workplace dispute can produce numerous different claims, each
with its own particular set of standards and enforcement schemes. Moreover, even a single allegation—a discriminatory failure to promote, for instance—often implicates multiple claims and standards because both federal and state law apply.73
The quantity of workplace rules and the possibility of multiple claims
are not the only problem. Many workplace laws focus on two fundamentally different approaches—individual versus collective workplace rights.74
At times, these approaches involve directly conflicting requirements, making it more costly for employers to comply with the rules, adjudicators to
decide cases, and employees to understand the rules.75
There appears to be little advantage to this cacophony of rules, which
makes the substantial costs of this system all the more difficult to accept.
71.
Morris, supra note 33, at 491 (“[Federal workplace law is] analogous to the six blind men
touching and describing an elephant. The subject matter . . . tends to be viewed as fragmented, unrelated parts, each bearing a different label . . . .”).
72.
Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L.
REV. 7, 19 (1988).
73.
See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006); N.Y. HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993).
74.
See infra note 93.
75.
Ann. C. Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act in the Unionized Workplace, 48 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 567, 606 (1994) (discussing conflict between employees’ NLRA right to request representation in disciplinary interview and employers’ interest in investigating possible Title VII violations).
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Take, for example, one of the more commonly disputed workplace actions: the termination of an employee. Depending on the facts, the employee could pursue a wide variety of claims under both federal and state
law.76 Possible state statutory claims include—but are by no means limited
to—antidiscrimination laws, whistleblower laws, and the antiretaliation
provisions of other state workplace laws.77 The number of these statutory
claims is growing, as state legislatures have become increasingly active in
expanding their governance of the workplace.78 Moreover, state common
law provides additional causes of actions, including contractual claims
such as breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, and tort claims for violations of public policy, defamation,
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.79 Relevant federal
statutes may include antidiscrimination laws such as Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),80 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).81 The employee could also make a retaliation
claim under those laws and others, such as the Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA),82 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),83 Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), and Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA).84 If the employee was terminated for engaging in union or other
collective activity, the NLRA may also be implicated. Further, if the employee worked for a public employer, there exists potential constitutional
claims, including free speech, freedom of religion, due process, equal
protection, and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.85 In
short, a single workplace action as commonplace as a termination can give
rise to a wide variety of claims, which are often difficult and costly to
litigate.

76.
See, e.g., Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (permitting discrimination
claim based on both age and sex).
77.
See, e.g., N.Y. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW § 296 (antidiscrimination); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 50-1-304 (whistleblower and retaliation). This increase may be partially in response to a lack of
federal activity.
78.
States Enacted More Labor Legislation in 2007, Including Wage, Immigration Laws, 27 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-11 (Feb. 11, 2008) (noting that 46 states had enacted new workplace statutes
in 2007); see also Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition
Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381
(2008) (arguing that states may increasingly attract business by promoting their employment law).
79.
Kathleen C. McGowan, Note, Unequal Opportunity on At-Will Employment: The Search for a
Remedy, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 141, 149–64 (1998) (describing variety of state approaches to employment at will).
80.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006).
81.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006).
82.
Id. §§ 2601–2654.
83.
Id. §§ 201–219.
84.
Id. §§ 651–678.
85.
See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (free speech); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709 (1987) (search and seizure); see also Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First
Amendment Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117 (2008).
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The costs of this complexity extend beyond the litigation context. The
sheer number of rules that overlap the federal and state systems, as well as
within each system, creates significant compliance costs.86 Consider an
employee who is injured at work. Such an employee will likely be entitled
to benefits under the state workers’ compensation system.87 In addition,
the employee may also be entitled to leave or accommodations under the
ADA88 and the FMLA.89 The injury may also involve violations of
OSHA.90 Each of these statutes, however, has different coverage provisions, so an employer must first determine whether the statutes apply to its
workforce in general or to the specific employee in question.91
Once the employer determines that an employee is covered by certain
laws, the difficulties continue. The employer must then ascertain whether
the employee is actually entitled to any benefits under those laws, while
also being careful not to take any actions that appear to retaliate against
the employee for taking advantage of those benefits.92 Further, if the
workplace is unionized, accommodation of the employee could conflict
with seniority provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement, threatening
future litigation.93
Adding to the complexity is the possible involvement of different jurisdictions with inconsistent laws.94 Indeed, companies employing workers
in multiple states face particularly significant compliance problems.95
Holding everything else equal, employers with business in multiple states
86.
See supra note 38; Susan J. McGolrick, Employee Rights: Overlap of ADA, FMLA, Workers’
Comp Challenging to Employers, Attorney Says, 151 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at C-1 (Aug. 7, 2001)
(“[E]mployers must consider the differences between the statutes and avoid assumptions that compliance with one is compliance with all.”).
87.
Nikita Williams, Note, HIV as an Occupational Disease: Expanding Traditional Workers’
Compensation Coverage, 59 VAND. L. REV. 937, 941 (2006).
88.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A) (2006).
89.
29 U.S.C. § 1612 (2006).
90.
Id. §§ 655, 656.
91.
See infra Part III.B.1.a.
92.
For example, an employee’s injury may be covered by workers’ compensation and qualify for
leave under the FMLA, yet not be serious enough to qualify as a disability under the ADA.
93.
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of the United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S.
757 (1983); Hodges, supra note 75, at 603–08.
94.
Cf. Immigration Advocates Urge Enactment of AgJOBS to End Shortage of Farmworkers, 203
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-10 (Oct. 22, 2007) (“Immigration activists decried Congress’ failure to
legislate immigration reform, noting that local governments are trying to fill the void by enacting ‘a
patchwork’ of ‘inconsistent’ ordinances that are ‘disruptive’ to local labor markets, particularly in
agriculture . . . .”).
95.
According to the Census Bureau, in 2002, 0.88% of all firms with paid employees operated in
more than one state and approximately 1.5% operated in more than one metropolitan area. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, COMPANY SUMMARY: 2002, 1366, 1368, Appendix A-1 (2006), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/ec02/sb0200cscosumt.pdf. However, approximately 17% of all establishments are owned by firms that operate in multiple states (20% in more than one metropolitan area),
and approximately 45% of all U.S. employees work for firms operating in more than one state (50%
for firms in more than one metropolitan area). Id. Thus, although the number of multistate firms is
small, the problems they face have a disproportionate impact on the workplace because they employ
almost half of all U.S. workers.
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would prefer uniform regulations to control their costs of compliance.96
Yet under today’s workplace regulatory system, such employers are required to comply with not only federal requirements, but also the different
rules associated with every state in which they have employees.97
Finally, workplace claims often implicate unique enforcement schemes
that require administrative, judicial, or arbitral procedures—or a mixture
of all three. Thus, the employer must be knowledgeable about the requirements and precedent of several different forums, even for a case involving a single set of facts.98
Differing claims and standards affect employees as well. Most obviously, if employers find it difficult to navigate the maze of workplace
rules, relatively unsophisticated and uninformed employees will find it far
more arduous. This creates an information asymmetry that makes enforcement extremely difficult and undermines the economic efficiency of
the regulatory system itself. 99 The difficulty in understanding the complex
system of workplace laws has a further impact. Like employees, jurors
and, at times, judges often balk at the level of complexity presented in
workplace cases, making attempts to enforce workplace rules much harder. For example, one study found that employment discrimination cases
involving multiple claims have a significantly lower rate of success.100
Part of the reason for this finding may be the type of judicial hostility
exhibited in Harrington v. Claiborne County Board of Education.101 The
district court in Harrington had taken seriously the Eleventh Circuit’s earlier statement that it “deplored muddled complaints in employment discrimination and civil rights cases and urged district courts to ‘take a firm
hand’ in ensuring efficient and clear proceedings on claims deserving trial.”102 Among other things, the district court’s Harrington decision—with
96.
Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized
Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1356 (2009).
97.
Lawrence Allen Vranka, Jr., Note, Defining the Contours of ERISA Preemption of State
Insurance Regulation: Making Employee Benefit Plan Regulation an Exclusively Federal Concern, 42
VAND. L. REV. 607, 626 (1989); cf. Peter M. Panken & Stacey M. Babson-Smith, Creating the Personnel Paper Trail: Personnel Manuals and Grievance Procedures, in EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR
RELATIONS LAW FOR THE CORPORATE COUNSEL AND THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER 259 (ALI-ABA
Feb. 15–17, 2007), available at SM031 ALI-ABA 249 (Westlaw) (discussing difficulties faced by
multistate employers in writing employment manuals).
98.
See infra Part II.B.2; Ann C. Hodges, The Limits of Multiple Rights and Remedies: A Call for
Revisiting the Law of the Workplace, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 601, 608 (2005).
99.
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89, 97
(2008).
100.
Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1439, 1456–59 (2009) (finding that employers won summary judgment in 96% of employment
discrimination cases involving multiple claims, in contrast to other studies showing employers’ general
employment discrimination summary judgment rates to be approximately 70–75%, and suggesting
reliance on multiple claims is viewed as a sign that those claims are weak).
101.
251 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 2001), cited in Kotkin, supra note 100, at 1461–62.
102.
Id. at 938.
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the Eleventh Circuit’s subsequent approval—required plaintiffs alleging
multiple claims of employment discrimination to either accept a bifurcated
trial addressing each ground separately or to argue an “intersectional”
claim of discrimination that identifies a subclass of discrimination, such as
a Muslim woman or a Catholic man.103 The Eleventh Circuit’s explicit
complaint about complex employment discrimination claims, in addition to
special rules limiting employees’ ability to choose how they pursue their
claims, exhibits a level of judicial hostility that must be taken into account
in any reform efforts.
Recent employment discrimination data reveal the extent of this complexity problem. Even within a specific area of workplace law, the number
of cases involving multiple theories has increased over the last fifteen
years. One study has shown that the number of discrimination claims contained in each charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has grown from 1.13 claims per charge in 1993 to 1.23
claims per charge in 2006.104 Although these numbers indicate that a large
number of cases involve no more than a couple of different claims, over
half of all discrimination charges filed with the EEOC still involve multiple claims—each of which raises the potential for varying requirements
or standards.105 Studies of cases that are actually litigated in federal court
find evidence of even more complexity.106
No legal regime can completely eliminate judicial resistance to claims
that allege, often accurately, that an adverse employment decision was the
result of several unlawful factors. However, a new approach to workplace
regulation could significantly reduce this hostility by simplifying and
streamlining workplace claims. For example, by applying a single reasonable business justification rule to all terminations or by using a single legal
framework for all claims within a single case, the overall complexity of
workplace cases would decrease.107 This decrease would likely prompt a
similar reduction in the judicial hostility to workplace claims in general.
The result would be a higher success rate for workplace claims, as meritorious cases are less likely to be swept away in attempts to relieve overloaded dockets.

103.
Id. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s holding that an employer could choose
the order in which the plaintiff had to present each individual claim to the jury and its holding that an
employer would be entitled to attorney’s fees if it won even one of the separate issues. Id.
104.
Kotkin, supra note 100, at 1451–52. All Title VII claims must be filed with the EEOC as a
“charge” before being filed in court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).
105.
Id. at 22.
106.
Id. at 18 (citing Vivian Berger et al., Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment
Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45, 46 (2005) (finding that 58% of sampled
cases involved multiple claims)).
107.
Hirsch, supra note 99, at 93.
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It is no surprise that today’s workplace laws are often ineffective in
accomplishing their goals.108 The costs of complying with the varying rules
are significant. Moreover, employers must account for the possibility that
its competitors may simply choose to ignore some requirements—often a
feasible option given the hurdles that employees face in enforcing the
laws.109 The result is that the policies of today’s workplace laws are undermined by their sheer number and complexity. This problem has created
a suboptimal level of regulation that should be remedied by decreasing the
number of workplace laws and simplifying the ones that remain.
3. Multiple Forums
The existence of multiple rules governing the workplace creates duplication and confusion not only in the standards that employers must follow,
but also in the manner in which claims are adjudicated. In particular, the
forums in which a worker must enforce various claims are often different
and may include a federal court, a state court, a federal administrative
agency, a state administrative agency, or an arbitrator.110 This fragmented
adjudicatory system is burdensome for employers, which must become
familiar with the wide array of possible forums. Even worse is the real
possibility that an employee will be required to pursue claims involving
the same set of facts in different forums.111 This duplication is characteristic of a suboptimal enforcement system, as it wastes adjudicatory resources, imposes extra costs on employers and employees, and delays resolution of workplace disputes.
The Supreme Court case of University of Tennessee v. Elliot provides
a good example of the problems caused by multiple forums.112 The plaintiff in Elliot was a black employee who alleged that the university’s proposal to terminate him was based on racial discrimination.113 The employee requested a state administrative hearing on the proposed action and,
before the hearing started, he also filed a lawsuit in federal district court
claiming violations of Title VII; Sections 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and
1988;114 and the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.115 The em108.
Befort, supra note 49, at 397 (“[L]egal rules governing the employment relationship consist of
a crazy quilt of regulation emanating from a variety of sources—federal and state, legislative and
judicial. These regulations . . . bear little relationship to one another beyond having applicability in the
workplace setting.”).
109.
Hodges, supra note 98, at 614.
110.
Befort, supra note 49, at 398; see also Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 586 n.1 (Ariz.
1987) (discussing plaintiff who pursued both state and federal lawsuits for same factual dispute).
111.
PERRITT, supra note 43, § 11.03, at 15 (citing cases); Michael D. Moberly, Proceeding Geometrically: Rethinking Parallel State and Federal Employment Discrimination Litigation, 18 WHITTIER
L. REV. 499, 502–04 (1997) (same).
112.
478 U.S. 788 (1986).
113.
Id. at 790.
114.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988.
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ployee lost in the administrative proceeding, but rather than appealing,
simply continued to pursue his federal lawsuit.116 The district court granted
summary judgment for the university, holding that the administrative decision should have preclusive effect against the lawsuit; however, the Sixth
Circuit reversed.117 The Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit that
the unreviewed administrative decision could not have preclusive effect
over the employee’s Title VII claims,118 but held that the decision could
preclude the employee’s other civil rights claims.119
The problem is not with the Court’s holding, which was a reasonable
interpretation of the relevant provisions. Rather, the issue is that these
related laws had such differing standards—standards that, by their nature,
are often dispositive to a case. The time and resources used in the administrative proceeding eliminated one set of claims in the lawsuit, but the judicial litigation continued as if the state agency and its decision never existed. This makes no sense, particularly because there seems to be no policy justification for precluding some of these claims, but not others. There
was one central dispute in Elliot: did the university seek to terminate the
employee because of performance problems or because of racial animus?
Parties should be able to—indeed, should have to—resolve such issues in a
single forum.120
The Elliot case highlights the possibility that multiple forums are not
only inefficient, but may also result in conflicting results. A case in which
that possibility became a reality is W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759,
International Union of the United Rubber Workers.121 The Supreme Court
in W.R. Grace held that a court could not overrule an arbitrator’s award of
backpay for a termination that violated a collective-bargaining agreement,
even though the termination was made pursuant to a conciliation agreement with the EEOC.122 In other words, the employer had settled a Title
VII claim with the agency entrusted to enforce that act, but the employer
115.
Elliot, 478 U.S. at 791.
116.
Id. at 792.
117.
Id.
118.
Id. at 795 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b)(5) (requiring EEOC to give “substantial weight”—not
preclusive effect—“to final findings and orders made by State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local . . . law”)).
119.
Id. at 797.
120.
Another example is Tipler v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971),
in which the employee first had his termination litigated as an unfair labor practice charge under the
NLRA, which the NLRB rejected. Id. at 127. Based on the exact same set of facts, the employee then
pursued a Title VII claim with the EEOC and then in federal court. Id. The Second Circuit ultimately
affirmed the district court’s refusal to give the NLRB decision preclusive effect against the lawsuit,
noting that adjudications had significant differences—primarily that the NLRB looked only to whether
the NLRA, not Title VII, was violated. Id. at 128–29.
121.
461 U.S. 757 (1983).
122.
The EEOC agreement required the company to maintain the existing proportion of women
during layoffs, which contradicted the collective-bargaining agreement’s seniority provision. Id. at
760.
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still faced liability because that settlement violated its contract with a union. To be sure, this situation was in part the employer’s own doing.123
Yet, the fact remains that multiple forums and conflicting statutory policies made this case far more complex than necessary.
As W.R. Grace illustrates, the presence of a union further complicates
workplace cases. For example, if an employee alleges that she was terminated because of her union activity and race, the number of forums rapidly
multiplies.124 The employee or, in rare occasions, the EEOC must pursue
the race claim under Title VII in state or federal court. The union claim is
possibly governed under two different regimes. It will, at a minimum, fall
under the NLRA’s administrative process. The NLRB’s General Counsel
has sole authority to seek enforcement of the NLRA and all such cases are
initially adjudicated before the same agency.125 Moreover, if there is a
collective-bargaining agreement, the union or employee would likely allege that the termination violated that agreement. Attempts to enforce a
collective-bargaining agreement requires one of two additional forums—an
arbitration claim or a federal district court suit under Section 301 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act.126 Thus, this single termination could
lead to litigation in one or more of five distinct forums.
One could argue that different forums make sense if the various adjudicators have special expertise in their respective jurisdictions. This argument is often used to justify administrative litigation, such as the NLRB’s
adjudication of NLRA claims.127 Even taking that argument as true—and
the NLRB’s history raises substantial doubt about whether its specialization provides benefits that outweigh its costs128—the marginal benefit of a
specialized adjudicator is overwhelmed by the aggregate costs of multiple
forums.129 Workplace disputes do not always develop neatly under one set
of specialized rules or another. The employment relationship is complicated; thus, workplace disputes are often impossible to classify as a single
type of claim. Moreover, many currently existing forums do not involve
123.
Id. at 767 (“The [employer] committed itself voluntarily to two conflicting contractual obligations. When the Union attempted to enforce its contractual rights, the [employer] sought a judicial
declaration of its respective obligations under the contracts. During the course of this litigation, before
the legal rights were finally determined, the [employer] again laid off employees and dishonored its
contract with the Union. For these acts, the [employer] incurred liability for breach of contract.”).
124.
Morris, supra note 33, at 484–85.
125.
NLRA cases are first adjudicated by an administrative law judge (ALJ); a challenge to an
ALJ’s determination goes before a panel of NLRB members and subsequent appeals go to a federal
appellate court and, possibly, the United States Supreme Court. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159–160 (2006).
126.
Id. § 185.
127.
Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation To Address Workplace
Captive Audience Meetings in the United States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 209, 232 (2008).
128.
See infra note 267.
129.
See, e.g., David L. Gregory, Unsafe Workplaces, Injured Employees, and the Bizarre Bifurcation of Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 111 W.VA. L. REV. 395 (2009) (discussing
problems with NLRB’s failure to regulate claims by employees injured at work or victims of sexual
harassment).
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any specialization.130 Instead, the numerous sources of workplace laws are
often the sole reason that a dispute may require multiple forums. The
complexity and waste of resources that this fragmented enforcement system entails demands a more simplified scheme.
4. Statutory Confusion
The costs associated with the multitude of workplace laws is compounded by the confusion present in each one individually. Any given law
has its own peculiar ambiguities and complexities.131 No matter how
pragmatic the policymaking, issues such as pleading requirements, burdens of proof, summary judgment standards, affirmative defenses, and
remedies make litigation far from simple. Multiplying those challenges by
the number of federal and state laws that currently exist creates a system
that is not only complicated, but also prevents many employers and employees from being aware of those laws’ basic rights and requirements.132
Given the difficulties inherent in any one law, the few benefits that may be
associated with this degree of statutory specialization are outweighed by
the costs required to enforce these laws, particularly when several different laws are implicated by a single workplace dispute. This suboptimal
structure can be improved by simplifying the standards of each law and,
where appropriate, using the same standards for multiple laws.
Unnecessarily confusing standards undermine parties’ ability to understand, comply with, and enforce workplace rules, thereby rendering them
far less effective than they were intended.133 This confusion hurts most the
individuals those rules were designed to protect—employees. In addition to
problems with employer compliance and judicial enforcement, employees’
inability to understand their rights severely undermines the efficacy of
workplace laws. An empirical study by Professor Pauline Kim on employees’ knowledge of their legal protections reveals the significance of
130.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
131.
See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Dunne, Comment, The Embarrassing Secret of Immigration Policy:
Understanding Why Congress Should Enact an Enforcement Statute for Undocumented Workers, 49
EMORY L.J. 623, 644 n.129 (2000) (describing difficulties facing Vidalia onion growers in understanding and complying with federal employment and immigrations laws) (citing U.S. GEN. ACCT.
OFFICE, Pub. No. GAO/HEHS-98-236R, H-2A AGRICULTURAL GUESTWORKER PROGRAM:
EXPERIENCES OF INDIVIDUAL VIDALIA ONION GROWERS 15 (1998), available at
http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf2/ 161115.pdf).
132.
For example, one employer has stated that “[i]t is difficult enough these days to comply with
the wealth of laws affecting business when you know what they require. It is almost impossible to do
so when you do not know and cannot find out what they ultimately require.” Dana M. Muir, From
Yuppies to Guppies: Unfunded Mandates and Benefit Plan Regulation, 34 GA. L. REV. 195, 240
(1999) (quoting Kastler on Delegation of Authority to IRS, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (BNA), Nov.
26, 1984).
133.
Cf. Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax Compliance and Tax
Simplification, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013 (2003) (arguing that simplifying tax code would increase
compliance).
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this problem.134 According to Kim’s study, approximately eighty percent
of employees incorrectly believed that their employers could not legally
terminate one employee to hire another at a lower wage, and nearly ninety
percent had the mistaken belief that they could not be fired because their
employers wrongly thought they had engaged in misconduct or because
their employers personally disliked them.135 Because most workplace laws
depend to a large degree on employees’ initiating and often pursuing enforcement on their own,136 this information gap is critical. An employee
who is unaware that her rights have been violated will obviously be unable
to exercise those rights.
Employees’ lack of knowledge also has a negative effect on employment generally. This information asymmetry creates a market failure that
results in an economically inefficient surplus of labor and corresponding
decrease in wages and benefits. Employees’ erroneously expansive view of
their workplace rights means that they are more willing to work than they
would be if they knew the true nature of their rights.137 The result is an
excessive supply of labor, which lowers employees’ compensation. Similarly, if employees incorrectly believe that they have certain rights, employers have little incentive to compete with each other to attract workers
by actually providing those rights.
The complexity within each individual law compounds the enforcement problems of the workplace governance system as a whole. A law
will fail to achieve its policy goals if employers, employees, and judges
find it difficult to understand the law’s requirements. This issue is ripe for
reform, as clarifying these laws would achieve significant gains while incurring few costs—thereby increasing the optimality of the entire
workplace regulatory system.
5. Adjudication Costs
As noted, the patchwork of federal and state workplace laws and their
various enforcement schemes have created a system in which a single set
of facts often leads to multiple claims brought in multiple forums.138 This
134.
Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of
Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1997); see also Mark V. Roehling,
The “Good Cause Norm” in Employment Relations: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications, 14
EMP. RESPS. & RTS. J. 91 (2002) (describing numerous studies showing employees’ erroneous view of
their discharge rights); Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205,
214–15 (2001).
135.
Kim, supra note 134, at 133–34.
136.
Brake & Grossman, supra note 1, at 862 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 415 (1975); Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 174–75 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Title VII
combats unlawful employment practices . . . principally through reliance on employee initiative.”)).
137.
Hirsch, supra note 99.
138.
See supra Part II.B.3.
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suboptimal complexity is costly and makes enforcement of those laws far
more difficult than necessary.139 The result is that employees must confront an unenviable and expensive decision of which claims to pursue and
in which forum.140 Employers, in turn, are unable to anticipate where their
workplace decisions may end up being challenged.141 Adjudicating these
complicated claims also imposes significant costs on judicial and administrative systems.142
In addition to these costs, the mere perception that litigation is expensive interferes with the enforcement of workplace claims. Employers
perceive the costs of workplace litigation to be much higher than they actually are, which artificially lowers demand for labor.143 A major factor in
this problem is employers’ inability to properly account for the risk of
monetary judgments; a simpler enforcement system would enable employers to better understand the true costs of workplace litigation and bring
their demand for labor closer to the economically efficient level.144 This
increase in labor demand would lead to higher rates of employment and
compensation.
These extraneous adjudication costs could be viewed as reasonable if
they were accompanied by equivalent benefits. However, that does not
appear to be the case. Even ignoring the costs associated with parties’ inability to judge the expense of workplace litigation, our current system of
workplace governance creates an adjudicatory system that is far more costly than necessary. Although there may be some isolated exceptions, 145 the
multiple claims and forums required for workplace cases have little to no
benefit. Moreover, for low-wage employees, virtually all litigation is
beyond their reach, thereby making most workplace protections illusory.
Thus, reform attempts should attempt to streamline adjudication and provide less expensive forums for certain cases.146 The benefits of such
changes would likely overwhelm any accompanying costs.
139.
See Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 170 (2007).
140.
See PERRITT, supra note 43, § 1.8, at 17.
141.
See, e.g., Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussing termination case in which employee pursued state public policy tort claims following rejection of
federal claims under Mine Safety and Health Act and NLRA, and attempt to arbitrate claim under
collective–bargaining agreement), overruled on other grounds by Brentwood v. Boeing Co., 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 506, (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 1999); Krueger, supra note 41, at 646 (noting problems with
current common law system’s ex ante uncertainty).
142.
See Kotkin, supra note 100, at 1459–63.
143.
JAMES N. DERTOUZOS & LYNN A. KAOLY, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, LABOR MARKET
RESPONSES TO EMPLOYER LIABILITY 51–52, 62 (1992).
144.
Employers include potential litigation costs as part of the marginal cost of using another unit
of labor. Thus, if litigation costs are perceived to be higher, labor costs will also be viewed as higher
and labor demand will decrease below the economically efficient level—that is, the level that would
exist if employers had an accurate view of litigation costs.
145.
See infra notes 267–268 and accompanying text.
146.
See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
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III. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO REGULATING THE WORKPLACE:
NATIONALIZING WORKPLACE LAW
A. Pragmatism and Optimal Workplace Regulation
The policymakers who implemented our current patchwork of
workplace laws largely ignored the compliance and enforcement costs of
this system, emphasizing the theoretical benefits of regulations rather than
their actual impact.147 What is needed is a deemphasis of this theoretical
approach in favor of a pragmatic one—an approach that would focus primarily on the ability of workplace laws to achieve their goals. Regulations
would be based not on their theoretical promise, but rather on their likely
outcomes and interactions with the entire workplace regulatory system.
The advantages of regulatory pragmatism do not depend on the existence of certain workplace rights. Instead of contemplating what rights
should exist, this policy-making theory asks first how society should attempt to achieve an already-determined set of rights. This is not to say that
identifying and advocating certain protections is not a worthy endeavor, as
there are a multitude of valuable proposals to expand workers’ rights.148
Yet, regulatory pragmatism intends to fill the gap that results when debates over the social value or cost of various workplace rules ignore their
practical effects. This gap has left many of the social policies at the heart
of today’s workplace laws unfulfilled—a serious shortcoming that regulatory pragmatism could help rectify.
A pragmatic reform of workplace regulation could take as many forms
as there are laws. Yet, because problems with the current system are
widespread, an expansive approach is warranted. In particular, this Article
proposes to fix the broken workplace governance system through a dramatic centralization and compression of workplace laws. This reform
would nationalize workplace law by replacing state authority over most
workplaces with exclusive federal regulation. The new national workplace
regime would further improve the suboptimal nature of today’s fragmented
enforcement system through an aggressive streamlining of workplace
laws; creation of a new, specialized workplace court; and centralization of
administrative authority within a single agency. These changes would de-

147.
Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65 (2007) (showing that whistle-blower statute
failed to fulfill expectations).
148.
One of the most far-reaching and heralded of these proposals—albeit one that was not
adopted—was the final report of the Commission on the Future of Worker–Management Relations.
U.S. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER–MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, THE DUNLAP COMMISSION
ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER–MANAGEMENT RELATIONS – FINAL REPORT (1994), available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/2/.
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crease the costs of compliance,149 lower the barriers to enforcement, and
improve the effectiveness of dispute adjudication.150
For example, as described in more detail elsewhere,151 an exclusive
federal workplace regime could replace the myriad rules governing the
end of the employment relationship with a single reasonable business justification requirement for all terminations. This universal termination rule
would likely achieve greater social benefits than the laws it would supplant. Employment discrimination under Title VII provides a perfect illustration. Although perhaps counterintuitive, the termination rule’s reasonable business justification requirement would achieve greater reductions in
employment discrimination by eliminating the backlash that has created
hostility and resistance to Title VII discrimination claims. The termination
rule’s simplification of employers’ duties and employees’ enforcement
burdens would further reduce discrimination. In short, by implementing a
simple, universal standard that would apply equally to all employees, the
new termination rule could reduce employment discrimination more than
the numerous federal and state termination laws that currently exist.
To be sure, the proposal to nationalize workplace law is even more
ambitious than the universal termination rule and unlikely to be fully
enacted, at least in the near future. That infeasibility is not a fatal shortcoming, however. To the contrary, an aggressive examination of
workplace laws may spur new insights into problems that more narrow
reforms overlook.152 The general pragmatic recommendations of the proposal are important in their own right. Even if we do not fully remove
state authority over the workplace or consolidate all federal laws, any reduction in the number of claims resulting from a single dispute would be
beneficial. Similarly, where multiple laws are implicated, reducing unnecessary differences and the need to litigate in multiple forums would also
provide greater clarity for parties and enhanced enforcement for the laws
themselves. The hope is that, if nothing else, the general principles underlying the proposal to nationalize workplace law will prompt regulatory
reform that makes our current system more effective.

149.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (emphasizing that Congress intended Title VII to be enforced primarily through cooperation and voluntary compliance).
150.
Morris, supra note 33, at 475.
151.
Hirsch, supra note 99.
152.
This examination could occur via an expert panel, similar to the Dunlop Commission. See
supra note 148; see also Andrew B. Coan, Minimalism in Legal Scholarship: A Response to If People
Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 103 (Stanford Law, Working Paper No.
1005430, 2007) (arguing that “examining deep questions in a fresh context can cast them in a revealing new light” and criticizing “minimalist scholarship” which, by “refusing to confront deep theoretical questions[,] can seriously limit the interest of the remaining avenues for discussion . . . . [and] can
make superficial explanations appear more compelling than they really are while obscuring important
deep theoretical alternatives”).
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A pragmatic nationalization of workplace law would require two major transformations: “vertical integration” and “horizontal integration.”
Vertical integration would take away regulatory power from state governments and centralize it at the federal level. Horizontal integration would
assimilate various rules at a single governmental level, such as merging all
federal workplace rules into a unitary “federal workplace code.” Either
vertical or horizontal integration individually would move our workplace
regulatory system closer to the optimal level; yet vertical integration is the
important—and more radical—first step. Only after workplace law is nationalized can we realize the full benefits of horizontal integration, for it is
much easier to streamline and condense legal schemes within a single jurisdiction. Consequently, this Article’s primary focus will be the benefits
and process of vertical integration.
B. Vertical Integration: Nationalizing Workplace Law
1. A Pragmatic Approach to Federalism
Federalism, perhaps more than any other political theory, exemplifies
the need for regulatory pragmatism. Since the early days of the United
States, proponents of federalism often cited the theory as an overriding
policy concern that should govern outcomes at the expense of other considerations.153 This purported affinity for federalism154 is the antithesis of
regulatory pragmatism; the theory of state policymaking has become the
controlling idea, no matter its efficacy in a particular instance. The failure
to consider the practical effects of federalism in different areas is disturbing, for the decision between federal or state regulatory authority is likely
to have profound implications.
153.
David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2548 & n.18 (2005)
(citing and criticizing examples). One exception is Frank Cross’s evaluation of federalism’s and decentralization’s impact on corruption and quality of government services. See Frank B. Cross, The Folly
of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2002) (concluding that federalism is associated with more
corruption and poorer quality services, while decentralization, which is independent of federalism, is
associated with the opposite).
154.
The same criticism could be leveled against opponents of federalism as they also seem more
concerned with achieving specific outcomes than a general concern whether control resides in state or
federal government. See Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1307
(1999) (“[F]ederalism is consistently (and I contend inherently) employed only derivatively, as a tool
to achieve some other ideological end, rather than as a principled end in and of itself.”); Renee M.
Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 879, 897 (2006) (arguing that “many appeals to federalism are merely rhetorical
tactics within a broader political strategy”); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 931 (1994); Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Instrumentalism, and the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 906, 911 n.26 (2006)
(“[W]e should bring a healthy skepticism to claims about federalism given that political actors frequently deploy arguments about federalism as a means of advancing their substantive policy agendas.”).
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A pragmatic regulatory approach to this decision should examine the
advantages and disadvantages of a fragmented versus centralized system of
regulation.155 This approach has been entirely absent from the current system of workplace laws, which are the product of haphazard regulations by
various jurisdictions.156 The result is an overly complex enforcement
scheme that has repeatedly prevented workplace laws from achieving their
goals.157 This is no surprise, because a robust state governance regime
almost by definition increases the complexity and inconsistencies in the
law, particularly where non-preemptive federal standards also exist.158
Providing the federal government with exclusive authority would eliminate
much of this harmful complexity.159 The question, therefore, is whether
these costs of workplace federalism are outweighed by its benefits.
Proponents of federalism make several different claims about the
theory’s benefits. These purported advantages include the assertions that
federalism leads to better policy by allowing experimentation at the state
level,160 better reflects differences across communities,161 makes abuse less
likely by diluting power,162 and draws more people into the political
process.163 The Supreme Court has at times also defended federalism as a
155.
Ann Althouse has made a similar argument, albeit in a different context, suggesting that differing views of federalism on the Supreme Court “may find common ground by analyzing the relative
capacities of the different governmental institutions involved in federalism issues.” Ann Althouse,
Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE L.J. 979, 1021
(1993); see also Super, supra note 153, at 2549 (arguing that policymakers and scholars should look
more closely at how fiscal federalism works).
156.
See supra Part II.B.1.
157.
See supra Part II.A; Hodges, supra note 98, at 602 (emphasizing the “difficulties inherent in
patchwork regulation by state and federal statutory and common law”).
158.
See, e.g., Louise McIntosh Slaughter, Genetic Testing and Discrimination: How Private is
Your Information, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 79 (2006) (arguing for a federal genetic antidiscrimination bill and noting that “over thirty states have passed laws dealing with some aspect of genetic
discrimination, but they are a patchwork of different definitions, standards, and remedies”).
159.
Joan T. A. Gabel, Escalating Inefficiency in Workers’ Compensation Systems: Is Federal
Reform The Answer?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083 (1999) (arguing that exclusive federal workers’
compensation scheme would be superior to current state regulation); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking States
Out of the Workplace, 117 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 225 (2008), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/theyale-law-journal-pocket-part/legislation/taking-states-out-of-the-workplace/.
160.
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932); see Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 521–23 (1976). But see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Policy
and Federal Structure: A Comparison of the United States and Germany, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1587,
1591–97 (1994) (arguing that state experimentation will not usually occur).
161.
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (holding that federalism “will be more sensitive to the diverse needs
of a heterogen[e]ous society”).
162.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); Althouse, supra note 155, at 988 (noting Supreme Court’s defense of federalism as means to enhance democratic self-governance by diffusing
power).
163.
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE 75 (1991); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for
a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1988) (summarizing arguments). Another potential
advantage of federalism could be states’ role as a catalyst for federal action on more controversial
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means to ensure that individual rights are protected against an overcentralization of power.164 Yet this defense of federalism, like the others, does
not acknowledge that there are times when the theory fails—sometimes
miserably.165 Instead, the Court frequently endorses federalism based more
on theory than its actual effects.
For example, in Gregory v. Ashcroft,166 the Court ruled against state
judges who challenged a state constitution’s mandatory retirement rule as a
violation of the ADEA. The Court stated that federalism’s principal benefit is its ability to guarantee individual liberty.167 However, as Professor
Ann Althouse has noted, “[r]ather than siding with individual rights on a
case-by-case basis, the Gregory Court adopted a long-range strategy. The
Gregory Court chose to invigorate the states in a grand balance of power,
trusting that over time benefits would flow to individuals.”168
This approach to federalism is misguided. Educated guesses about the
result of a particular theory is a necessary aspect of decision making, but
the Court’s blind reliance on the belief that federalism will enhance individual rights was specious. At the same time that it was denying the Gregory plaintiffs’ individual liberty claims, the Court made little provision
for the possibility that federalism might fail to promote individual liberties
in all instances.169 The Court stated that it was not following federalism for
federalism’s sake; however, those words mean little if it refuses to consider whether state autonomy over a given area is likely to result in promised
benefits.170 This is an important question because it is hard to accept that
federalism is the key to guaranteeing individual liberties given states’ abysmal track record in defending such liberties.171
measures. See infra Part III.B.3.b.
164.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“State sovereignty is not just an end in
itself: ‘Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign
power.’”) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
165.
See infra note 171; Cross, supra note 154, at 1306–07 (1999) (“Federalism’s role in American
history as a stalking horse for racism is infamous. Southern states invoked states’ rights in an effort to
preserve first slavery and then segregation.”). Although Justice Brennan long argued that states have
an important role in filling gaps in the federal government’s protection of individual constitutional
rights, he also stressed the need for strong federal enforcement. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of
Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 535 (1986); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
166.
501 U.S. 452 (1991).
167.
Id. at 458.
168.
Althouse, supra note 155, at 1009.
169.
See infra note 171.
170.
Cf. Althouse, supra note 155, at 1021 (“Serious scrutiny of the state courts’ work ought to
precede deference” to those courts.).
171.
PETER SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW 94 (2000) (stating that federalism has “nourished some
of America’s most repellent and repressive political regimes”); Gregory P. Magarian, Toward Political Safeguards of Self-Determination, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1219, 1235 (2001); see also Theodore W.
Ruger, New Federalism: Introduction, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 91 (2004) (describing states’
opposition to “emancipation, antidiscrimination laws, [and] wages-and-hours legislation” and states’
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In spite of the purported advantages of federalism, one could argue
that this form of governance inhibits solutions to national problems and
allows states to pursue policies that are anathema to the rest of society.172
A more pragmatic approach—one that looks to the history of states’ respect for individual liberty and considers the likely effects of state regulation—would do much to avoid such problems.
To be sure, predicting policy outcomes is not an exact science.173
However, even an attempt at prediction would likely remedy many existing problems and result in better policy decisions. One example of a
pragmatic look at federalism is the work of Professor Frank Cross. He has
emphasized that many of federalism’s purported benefits actually relate to
decentralization which, perhaps ironically, is more prevalent in nonfederalistic countries.174 Cross also appropriately questions whether the benefits
attributed to federalism and decentralization actually exist in the real
world, and his attempt to find empirical support for these claims is exactly
the type of pragmatic approach that workplace policymakers should
adopt.175
Although there is little data on federalism’s effect on workplace laws,
the theoretical advantages of federalism do not appear to have come to
fruition in the workplace.176 To the extent that federalism may provide
some benefit, that positive effect seems to be outweighed by the costs incurred by the complexity that accompanies state regulation of the
workplace.177 The reality is that the current federalist approach to
workplace regulation is a relic that has no place in the modern economy.
2. A National Workplace Law for a National (and International)
Economy
At least four general approaches to apportioning regulatory authority
between federal and state governments exist: exclusive federal authority;
support for “slavery, segregation, child labor and underenforcement of domestic violence laws”);
Super, supra note 153, at 2614 (noting that states have hidden biases against programs intended to
serve low- and middle-income people).
172.
See infra notes 182–189 and accompanying text.
173.
Super, supra note 153 at 2553–54 (discussing the shortcomings in applying “comparative
process theory” of federalism, which argues that responsibility should be allocated to state or federal
governments based on which system generates the best outcomes, to fiscal policy).
174.
Cross, supra note 153, at 19–21, 27–29, 46–49.
175.
Cross, supra note 153, at 52–57; Cross, supra note 153, at 59 (“[D]ecisions about federalism
. . . should be grounded in a pragmatic assessment of their consequences. Dedication to preservation
and empowerment of state sovereignty, in its own intrinsic right, is insupportable, and the presumption
should be to the contrary.”).
176.
Admittedly, this conclusion is based on theory more than is ideal. However, pragmatic evaluation of policy does the best it can with the available information—the key is maintaining enough flexibility to change course should better information arise that undermines earlier determinations.
177.
See supra Part II.B.
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exclusive state authority; concurrent state and federal authority; and exclusive federal authority over some areas, with exclusive state authority over
others. Our current workplace regulatory system is a mix of the latter two
options—combining concurrent jurisdiction in some areas with exclusive
control by either federal or state governments over others. As noted, this
system has led to numerous problems, prompting the need to seek a better
form of regulation. A more pragmatic solution would be the first approach, as exclusive federal authority over all workplace matters provides
the best hope for achieving the optimal level of regulation and enforcement.
In the past, relying on state regulation of the workplace made sense, as
the economy was dominated by small businesses and agriculture—entities
that were truly local in scope.178 However, such workplaces play a far
smaller role in the current economic environment. Many employers are at
least regional, if not national or international, in scope.179 Even many local
employers have workers who cross state lines to make sales or engage in
other business. Except for truly small and local employers, which are already exempted from most federal workplace laws, there is little reason
for workplaces to be governed by the states. Indeed, there are many reasons why modern workplaces should not be subjected to state regulation,
particularly the costs of redundant or inconsistent rules.180 Exclusive federal regulation would eliminate such inefficiencies and provide more effective governance.181
State regulation of the workplace also causes economically inefficient
externalities that may result in a “race to the bottom”182 that hurts not only
workers, but state and national economies as well. Many states compete
with each other by lowering labor costs to attract employers. This strategy
comes as no surprise, for companies generally seek locations that offer
lower labor costs, including less labor regulation.183 Yet, more important
than the actual impact of labor costs on firm decision making is the perception among state policymakers that labor costs are important to attract178.
See supra Part II.A; Befort, supra note 49, at 385–86.
179.
Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise
of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 696, 699 (1994) (stating that the U.S. “economy became
a national economy during the late nineteenth century,” when at-will employment gained widespread
acceptance).
180.
See supra Part II.B.2.
181.
But cf. DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE DECISIONS IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD 180–83 (1999) (arguing for environmental deregulation).
182.
Bales, supra note 50 (discussing inter-jurisdictional employment standards competition, including states’ use of at-will doctrine to attract capital).
183.
Laura Bloodgood, Inbound and Outbound U.S. Direct Investment with Leading Partner Countries, J. INT’L COM. & ECON., Aug. 2008, at 63, 68; Geoffrey Kercsmar, Protecting the Golden
Goose: Canadian Union Security Agreements and Competitiveness in the Age of NAFTA, 15 DICK. J.
INT’L L. 593, 608 (1997) (discussing firms’ concern with labor costs and citing evidence that half of
American companies view state right-to-work laws as necessary to locate in particular state).
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ing business.184 As long as these policymakers hold this belief, and experience shows that many do,185 then their workplace regulations will reflect
that belief as well.
Although possibly successful in the short term, this strategy is destined
to fail—with negative consequences for the nation as a whole. Even the
state with the cheapest labor costs in the United States will never be able
to compete on those terms globally.186 A large number of countries are
able to offer significantly lower labor costs than any American state; thus,
states that compete for business on this ground will at most be more attractive to companies that have already decided to stay in the United States.
That small benefit is outweighed by the detrimental effects of selling the
state as a source of cheap labor.187 Far better would be to take advantage
of the United States’ comparative advantage—skilled labor. States that
stress education and high-quality standards of living will be able to attract
and train better workers, and it is those states that will be able to compete
globally in the long run.188 The cheap-labor states may have gained jobs
from other states in the short term, but they are chasing a shrinking market. Many types of low-skilled jobs will continue to move overseas, and
states that have a disproportionate share of those jobs will find themselves
with far poorer employment prospects than the high labor cost states they
initially “beat.”189 A national workplace policy would avoid much of this
race-to-the-bottom problem by eliminating interstate labor-cost competition.190
States also fail to consider the costs of their decisions to the nation as a
whole. The spillover effects caused by a state’s failure to invest in high-

184.
Cf. Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To
the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 348 (1997) (noting that state officials’ perception that strong
environmental enforcement drives out businesses matters more than actual effects on business migration).
185.
Glynn, supra note 78 (noting that some states try to use their regulation, or lack thereof, of
noncompetition agreements to attract business); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global
Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 987, 990–97
(1995).
186.
Larry Swisher, House Democratic Leaders Vows To Address Impacts of Globalization, Offshoring of Jobs, 134 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Jul. 13, 2007, at A-11 (quoting Princeton economist
Alan Blinder: “Because routine, impersonal service jobs that can be done anywhere in the world will
be at risk of moving to other countries, many of the most valuable skills for the jobs that remain will
require interpersonal skills, problem-solving abilities, and creativity.”); see also Bales, supra note 50
(discussing U.S. options to compete in global labor market).
187.
Bales, supra note 50; see also John Leland, As Iowa Job Surplus Grows, Workers Call the
Shots, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2008, at A14 (describing workers leaving Iowa because of low wages).
188.
Peter S. Goodman, In N.C., A Second Industrial Revolution; Biotech Surge Shows Manufacturing Still Key to U.S. Economy, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2007, at A1 (stating that successful manufacturing in the U.S. relies largely on goods and processes requiring higher skilled labor).
189.
Bales, supra note 50; cf. Cross, supra note 153, at 15–18 (arguing that the environmental
race-to-the-bottom argument has some merit, but is complicated).
190.
Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 408 (1997).
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skill job training are externalities that justify a national policy.191 These
externalities represent a suboptimal level of regulation because policymakers implement regulations based only on the costs to their state rather than
to the entire country. Federal policymaking, however, necessarily considers national costs, thereby avoiding these economically inefficient policies.
Structural differences between federal and state governments also
weigh in favor of a national approach to workplace regulation. Most state
legislator positions are part-time; thus, state policymakers possess far less
time, resources, and expertise than their full-time federal counterparts.192
The federal government, although far from perfect, is also more transparent and accessible than most state governments—and thereby more accountable.193 This transparency and accessibility is especially beneficial for
groups, such as employee advocates, which have fewer resources than
their opposition.194 Employers will always be able to influence every level
of government that has control over their interests, whether federal or
state. In contrast, employee-side groups have far fewer resources. By focusing policymaking in one jurisdiction, employee advocates would be
able to participate in all workplace policymaking, rather than forfeiting
certain state decisions because of resource-allocation concerns. The resources available to each side will never be equal, but concentrating decision-making authority in the federal government would at least allow all
sides to be in the game.
Certain types of workplace regulations also involve very high fixed
costs that are much better suited to centralized regulation. Safety and
health regulations, in particular, often demand extensive research and investigation. The federal OSHA statute has a host of problems,195 particularly a lack of adequate funding, but it is difficult to imagine that state
governments could do better.196 Indeed, a federalist approach to OSHA
regulations would incur a significant waste of resources. It makes no sense
to have multiple regulators investigate the same workplace health and safety risks; it is far more efficient to have a single, central authority perform
191.
Id. at 407.
192.
Andrew Stengel et al., Still Broken: New York State Legislative Reform (2008),
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/still_broken_new_york_state_legislative_reform_2008
_update/; cf. McCormick, supra note 4, at 207–08 (citing problems with states’ enforcement of antidiscrimination laws).
193.
Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized
Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333 (2009); Legislative Reform, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 67, 73–74
(2003).
194.
But see Hodges, supra note 98, at 603 (noting that major changes raise risks for groups with
fewer resources).
195.
Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of Workplace
Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1080–81 (2005).
196.
States currently possess limited authority to regulate workplace health and safety. RICHARD A.
BALES, JEFFREY M. HIRSCH, & PAUL M. SECUNDA, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 252–53
(2007)
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that task.197 Even with a high level of information sharing among states—
which is unrealistic to expect—different regulators will be forced to repeat
research and to devise often complicated rules governing these workplace
risks. There may be some advantage to dissimilar regulations in different
jurisdictions, but these benefits are likely outweighed by their costs.
Moreover, in the limited circumstances where dissimilarity makes sense,
federal policymakers could allow for some variance among jurisdictions.
3. The Failed Promise of Workplace Federalism
The proposal to nationalize workplace law has already prompted criticism. Some objections seem to be motivated primarily by a fear of the
unknown—an expected reaction given the revolutionary nature of the proposed change, yet not one that should stand in the way of possible improvements.198 Others defend our current system as providing the best
chance for expanding workers’ rights, an argument that is tied to the purported advantages of federalism.199
Although many theories have been raised in support of federalism
generally,200 two of the primary rationales for workplace federalism are
that the best policies arise from states experimenting with different
workplace laws and that state regulations can provide a political catalyst to
speed enactment of federal workplace laws.201 Those theories may be persuasive in some areas of the law; however, their benefits are far harder to
see in the workplace.
a. Laboratory Theory
A major argument in favor of workplace federalism is that state regulations can act as experiments that ultimately result in better policymaking.202 Yet, evidence that such experimentation actually occurs in
workplace law is wanting. Although state workplace regulations have
spread nationally at times, more often than not states simply choose from a
menu of preexisting options depending on their political composition at the
197.
An alternative would be a central research agency that shares information with state regulators. However, that requires a higher level of information sharing and state-level expertise than is
realistic.
198.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
199.
Secunda, supra note 8; infra notes 269–272 and accompanying text; cf. JAMES WEINSTEIN,
THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE, 1900–1918 (1968) (describing the railroads’ ability to
obtain less restrictive federal regulations to replace state rules).
200.
Supra notes 160–164 and accompanying text; Sandra F. Sperino, Recreating Diversity in
Employment Law by Debunking the Myth of the McDonnell Douglas Monolith, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 349,
354–59 (2007) (discussing benefits of workplace federalism).
201.
Other purported advantages of federalism, including opening up the political process, have
less relevance in the workplace. See supra notes 160–164, 192–197 and accompanying text.
202.
See supra note 160.
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time. Some exceptions exist,203 but they are too rare to outweigh the complications caused by state governance. Further, workplace federalism may
also suppress the development of laws at the federal level.204
More generally, Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman has argued that there
are two major problems with the experimentation theory of federalism.205
The first is a free-rider problem caused by jurisdictions’ preference to
borrow the innovations or experiments of other jurisdictions rather than
incur the expense of implementing their own.206 This problem is particularly acute where information about another jurisdiction’s innovation is
cheap to obtain, such as with public laws and regulations.207 This results in
a suboptimal level of innovation unless some central authority can enact
measures to overcome this collective-action problem.208
The second issue is an agency problem in which incumbent policymakers, who are typically risk averse, may be unwilling to engage in experiments that would benefit the jurisdiction as a whole.209 The possibility
of free-riding makes policymakers in federalist systems more risk averse
than unitary systems because the opportunity to copy innovations means
that the public will prefer the policymaker to free ride rather than risk
their own resources.210 This problem prevents a jurisdiction from capturing
all of the societal gains of innovation, thereby resulting in underinvestment
and a suboptimal level of innovation.211
Although Rose-Ackerman’s critique of federalism has not gained traction in many quarters, recent work by professors Brian Galle and Joseph
203.
See infra note 229.
204.
See infra note 227.
205.
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking And Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980).
206.
Id. at 604. “Innovation” refers generally to new policies while “experimentation” refers to
different means of implementing a given policy. For the sake of simplicity, this Article will use “innovation” to include both ideas.
207.
Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition: Lessons from Patents,
Yachting and Bluebooks, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 545 (1995) (describing the inability to “patent”
corporate law innovation and protect them from copying by other states); Galle & Leahy, supra note
193, at 1351.
208.
Galle & Leahy, supra note 193, at 1335–36.
209.
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 205, at 614–15. Galle and Leahy raise the possibility that selfserving policymakers could provide net social gains by disregarding their constituents’ risk aversion,
but argue that policymakers are likely to be more, not less, risk averse than the public. Galle & Leahy,
supra note 193, at 1371–75. A similar problem is common in firms, where managers may have interests that differ from those of shareholders or the firm as a whole. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M.
Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325, 337–38 (1995); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 35 (1986);
Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540, 571 (1995).
210.
Galle & Leahy, supra note 193, at 1370. Galle and Leahy note the “empirical observation that
marginal innovation [the amount of innovation added by a new jurisdiction] appears to diminish as the
number of jurisdictions increases.” Id. at n. 81.
211.
In some areas, such as law governing corporate charters, some of these problems can be
overcome if there is an advantage to being the first to implement an innovation. See Glynn, supra note
78. However, there is little competitive benefit to being the first to innovate in workplace law.
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Leahy has breathed new life into the idea that federalism does not necessarily lead to more experimentation.212 Galle and Leahy synthesize a long
history of research on innovation in decentralized systems to test RoseAckerman’s thesis. Their central conclusion is that Rose-Ackerman was
justified in doubting federalism’s ability to spur innovation.213
Although state governments innovate, according to Galle and Leahy,
“they are unlikely [to do so] in all instances at the optimal social level, or
in a way that captures the true benefits of experimentation.”214 Suboptimal
levels of innovation are most likely to occur where innovation is useful to
other jurisdictions, there are inexpensive means to gain information about
others’ innovations, and it is cheap to copy such innovations.215 All of
these conditions apply to workplace law. Regulations are matters of public
knowledge, and the differences in workplace conditions among states are
small enough to make the borrowing of policies worthwhile.
This inability to achieve an optimal level of innovation may warrant a
centralized, federal system of regulation that can correct the market failures of state governance. Although one can point to examples of state
workplace innovation, these examples do not undermine the idea that the
level of such innovation falls below what an ideal central regulator would
enact.216 Federal governance, of course, is not ideal. However, Galle and
Leahy argue that federal governance is in a better position to achieve or
approach an optimal level of regulation, not that it will do so in every instance.217 That is the exact point of the proposal to nationalize workplace
law: the federal government is better situated to achieve an optimal level
of workplace innovation and regulation than are state governments. Even
if federal governance does not result in the best outcome in every instance,
exclusive federal authority provides the best chance for our workplace
governance system to approach the optimal level of regulation.
Further, if real experimentation is to occur, at least one jurisdiction
must adopt a policy that looks less likely to be successful.218 But this is
unlikely to occur even in a federalist system, as the political costs of such
risk-taking are too high. In contrast, a central authority could force such
experimentation among its subdivisions.219 This problem is reflected in
212.
Galle & Leahy, supra note 193; see also Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:
Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 924–26 (1994) (noting that a unitary
government could encourage experimentation among sub-units).
213.
Galle & Leahy, supra note 193, at 1398–1400.
214.
Galle & Leahy, supra note 193, at 1338 n.19.
215.
Galle & Leahy, supra note 193, at 1399–1400.
216.
See Galle & Leahy, supra note 193, at 1343 n. 37.
217.
Galle and Leahy also recognize the shortcomings of federal regulation and raise the possibility
that private firms or hybrid state/private entities may provide a beneficial alternative. Galle & Leahy,
supra note 193, at 1400.
218.
Rubin & Feeley, supra note 212, at 925.
219.
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
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workplace law, where there is not a wide assortment of state rules. More
often than not, states simply choose from a limited set of existing policy
choices based on their political demographics, rather than an attempt to
innovate.220 Accordingly, the workplace law differences among states generally do not represent true innovation or an attempt to discover the best
policy.
Even where workplace innovation does occur, it is quite limited and is
often located in larger states and municipalities.221 This is likely due to the
economies of scale in acquiring the expertise needed to create innovative
policy.222 Thus, there are still suboptimal levels of innovation among the
substantial number of states too small to afford true innovation. In contrast, the federal government has a broader expertise and larger bureaucracy than any state and is therefore in the best position to innovate.
b. Political Catalyst Theory
Where state regulation is most likely to have a positive effect is in laying the groundwork for new laws, particularly controversial ones.223 By
incrementally enacting measures in smaller geographical areas, state governments could lessen resistance to certain regulations, which would ultimately result in the passage of federal legislation more rapidly than under
a nationalized workplace system. A recent example is the attempt to ban
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.224 There is a
plausible argument that the experience of a handful of states is helping the
development of federal law that would ban sexual orientation discrimination at work.225 It is unclear whether the federal government is acting at
the same speed it would have absent these state laws—indeed, although
sexual orientation discrimination has been prohibited in the federal
workplace for many years,226 there is still no federal protection that applies
to private employers—but it is fair to say that states’ experiences will
ism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314–23 (2008) (suggesting ways to prompt local experimentation).
220.
Galle & Leahy, supra note 193, at 1368 (discussing states’ tendency to “pluck what seem to
them to be the lowest hanging new fruits, rather than sorting among all of the available alternatives to
select the most appealing”).
221.
For instance, California is generally considered to have relatively expansive protections for
workers.
222.
Galle & Leahy, supra note 193, at 1367.
223.
See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007).
224.
Jennifer S. Hendricks, Instead of ENDA, A Course Correction for Title VII, 103 Nw. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 209, 209–10 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ lawreview/Colloquy/2008/
43/ LRColl2008n43 Hendricks.pdf (describing recent legislative action to enact the Employment NonDiscrimination Act (ENDA)).
225.
Of course, Congress has yet to pass ENDA, and the fact that its prospects are looking better is
more the result of changes in federal politics than state policymaking.
226.
Exec. Order No. 13,160, 65 Fed. Reg. 39775 (June 23, 2000).
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make any future federal legislation easier. However, shortening the timeline for the development of a few laws does not mean that workplace federalism makes sense generally.
It is also possible that, absent state authority in this area, the federal
government may have been more aggressive about developing protections
for sexual orientation. Take, for example, the statement of one senator in
defense of Congress’s rejection of the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act (ENDA) of 1996, which would have added sexual orientation to Title
VII’s protected classes:
If this Congress had adopted ENDA, we would have ended State
experimentation and forced one uniform solution—punitive damages and all—onto every State. Rejecting ENDA is the choice that
leaves the States free to adopt whatever policies they choose.
Thus, from a federalism perspective, ENDA was an intrusion on
the States’ ability to make choices . . . .227
This statement serves as a useful reminder that concurrent state legislation
does not necessarily result in more workplace protections. It is impossible
to know whether legislators who cite states’ rights arguments are truly
supporting state autonomy rather than merely using that argument as a
convenient political tool. Yet eliminating concurrent federal and state governance would also eliminate the ability of policymakers to use state law
as an excuse not to enact national workplace legislation.
It is important to note as well that a centralized government can often
move faster and more effectively than a federalist system, particularly in
reaction to changing circumstances. The FMLA is a good example of the
federal government, while not the first jurisdiction to act, taking the lead
in implementing broad family and medical leave protections for workers.
Although some state measures existed before the FMLA, they were significantly more limited than the federal act.228 Indeed, Congress’s action was
the catalyst for most of the FMLA-like state laws that exist today.229

227.
142 CONG. REC. S12015-01, S12016 (Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
228.
Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 733–34 (2003) (noting women-only
childcare leave policies and lack of family leave requirements). But see Henry Drummonds, Beyond
the Employee Free Choice Act Debate: Unleashing the States in Labor-Management Relations Policy,
19 CORN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 118–19, n.188 (2009) (citing the FMLA as one example of the
advantages of state authority).
229.
Nev. Dept. of Human Res. 538 U.S. at 732–33 (citing S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 20 (1993), and S.
Rep. No. 102-68, at 77 (1991)). A notable counter example is state employment protection for disabled private-sector workers. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 n.5
(2001); see also William A. Herbert & Amelia K. Tuminaro, The Impact of Emerging Technologies in
the Workplace: Who’s Watching the Man (Who’s Watching Me)?, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 355,
365–66 (2008) (discussing state genetic discrimination laws). But see supra note 158.
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Finally, if Congress implemented the proposal to nationalize
workplace law, it could do so in a manner that takes advantage of states’
ability to act as a catalyst. Congress would need to affirmatively preempt
various areas of state workplace law to avoid leaving regulatory gaps in
areas that the federal government has not yet addressed. During this transition phase, state regulation in a given area would continue to develop
until the federal government takes over. Moreover, the federal government could allow limited instances of state regulation in areas in which it
believed that experimentation would be especially beneficial.230 Only a
national workplace regime can take into account such circumstances while
eliminating many of the problems associated with our current federalist
model of workplace regulation.
C. The Federal Workplace Code
The manner in which Congress would nationalize workplace law is of
obvious importance. The effect of such a monumental change would depend on, among other things, decisions about which legal claims would be
nationalized, how the federal government would exercise its expanded
authority, and how such claims would be adjudicated. These questions are
complex and warrant an article unto themselves. What follows, therefore,
is merely the broad outline of a possible nationalized workplace regulatory
system.
As briefly described below, this federal workplace code would literally cover all workplace issues by replacing all statutory, administrative, and
common-law workplace rules from all jurisdictions, whether federal or
state. The transition to a federal workplace code need not, and should not,
be instantaneous. Preemption of state law would occur in phases to avoid
creating legal vacuums in areas where there is currently no federal law
and, in isolated circumstances, would allow for some state governance.231
The federal workplace code would also involve a serious attempt to
horizontally integrate nationalized workplace rules. The various standards,
definitions, procedures, and other aspects of those rules would be streamlined as much as possible. Although some particularly unique areas would
require specific requirements, most areas could be merged. Moreover,
authority to interpret and enforce the new code would fall to a single federal administrative agency, while attempts would be made to simplify adjudication of disputes and to broaden access to the adjudicatory process.
230.
For example, states may have acquired expertise in differences between western and eastern
coal deposits that require unique mine safety regulations. Cf. William S. Mattingly, If Due Process is
a Big Tent, Why Do Some Feel Excluded From the Big Top?, 105 W.VA. L. REV. 791, 801 (2003)
(noting change in health risk to miners because of shift from eastern underground mines to western
strip mines).
231.
See id.
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1. Which Law To Nationalize?
The first issue for the new federal workplace code is to identify which
state laws it would nationalize. The quick answer is virtually all of them.
One of the main advantages of vertical integration is to bring the large and
diverse set of laws regulating the workplace under one regulatory umbrella. Making the coverage of the new federal workplace code as broad as
possible would also provide more opportunities to horizontally integrate
laws.
The most obvious areas for coverage are those claims that strike at the
heart of the employment relationship. These areas include all current federal workplace laws, such as those dealing with discrimination, collective
action, wage and hour claims, and employee benefits. However, areas that
only affect the workplace tangentially, like Social Security law, need not
be included under the federal workplace code.
State law is a more vexing question. State claims directly related to the
workplace are obvious candidates for preemption—including state-level
discrimination and wage and hour laws, the at-will default and its exceptions,232 unemployment insurance,233 and workers’ compensation.234 Other
areas may be relevant in the workplace, but are not primarily workplace
laws. These indirect workplace claims include common law torts—such as
defamation, intentional interference with business relations, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress—as well as trade secret and other intellectual property regulations. Although there is a risk of unnecessarily interfering with these areas of state law, the federal code should include such
claims as they apply to the workplace absent a specific reason not to do
so. Failing to nationalize these areas would maintain some of the confusing myriad of laws plaguing the current system of workplace rules. Moreover, courts have struggled to apply these laws to the workplace, often
creating special rules for such cases.235 Thus, there is little lost and much
to be gained by simply carving out these special workplace rules from
each area of law and including them in the federal workplace code.

232.
See, e.g., Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to
-915 (2007) (establishing limited just-cause termination requirement).
233.
Unemployment insurance programs were created under the auspices of the federal government, but are operated by the states. See Bales et al., supra note 196, at 180–81.
234.
State employees would also be included. See Hirsch, supra note 99, at 117–18 (discussing
application of unitary federal rule to state employees without running afoul of sovereign immunity
interests).
235.
See, e.g., Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (refusing to apply covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment contract).

File: HIRSCH EIC PUBLISH.doc

1066

Created on: 12/6/2010 2:25:00 PM

Last Printed: 12/6/2010 3:28:00 PM

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 61:5:1025

2. Horizontal Integration: Streamlining Workplace Law and its Enforcement
After eliminating state authority over the workplace, one of the most
important changes wrought by the new federal workplace code would be
to consolidate and streamline workplace rules and their enforcement. Although there are limits to the degree of simplification possible, the level of
duplication and other inefficiencies that exist today leave plenty of opportunities. The most fruitful areas for this horizontal integration include statutory differences involving substantive standards, procedural rules, and
coverage issues.
One of the more confusing elements of workplace litigation is that different claims, even if they involve similar issues, often require significantly different analyses. The new federal code could dramatically streamline
workplace litigation by giving most claims the same standard for issues
such as the level of causation, the burdens required of each party, and
affirmative defenses. Procedural issues are ripe for consolidation as well.
Even if a dispute centers on a single event—a termination, for instance—
there may be several different statutes of limitation, filing requirements,
and other procedural requirements, depending on the alleged claims. Most
of these differences impose costs on parties, yet have few benefits.
The disparate coverage standards under today’s workplace laws are
perhaps the best example of this problem. Issues such as the definition of
an employer or employee differ significantly depending on the claim.
Thus, in a case involving the same employer and a single set of facts, a
worker may be considered a covered employee for one claim but not
another. Although there may be support for some of these differences,236
the small benefit gained by expanding or contracting these definitions in
certain contexts pales in comparison to the costs that result from this lack
of consistency.
For example, the three primary federal antidiscrimination laws have
small but important differences in their small-employer exemption. Title
VII and the ADA apply to employers with fifteen employees, while the
ADEA requires twenty employees.237 Even if one considered age discrimination to be less serious, there is little to be gained from the relatively
small difference among the minimum number of employees—yet there is
much to be lost. These antidiscrimination statutes are similar in their general regulatory approach. It does not make sense, therefore, to require
236.
Sec’y of Lab. v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1543–45 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing need for
more expansive definition of “employee” under FLSA). FMLA leave requirements may also impose
such a significant toll on truly small employers that a broader employee or employer exclusion may be
justified. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2006).
237.
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2006) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b) (2006) (Title VII); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5) (ADA).
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employers with fifteen to nineteen employees to comply with Title VII and
the ADA, but not the ADEA. Indeed, the difficulties in complying with
the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirements would suggest that of
the three statutes, the ADA would be most likely to exempt small employers.238 Thus, the federal workplace code could improve this suboptimal
situation by making all, or nearly all, workplace rules apply to the same
employers—for instance, by exempting all firms with less than five employees.239 This change would improve compliance and enforcement of
workplace rules, while imposing few additional costs.
Finally, the workplace code could integrate and improve the means of
adjudication and administration. The multiple forums often required to
resolve a distinct workplace dispute is a significant problem that could be
eliminated by creating a single adjudicatory body. Some form of federal
Article III court, whether a general court or a specialized workplace
court,240 probably provides the best level of expertise and protection for
parties, although other models—such as arbitration—could work as well.241
Our current adjudicatory model also creates an access problem in
which many low-wage workers are unable to litigate their claims. There is
no easy solution to this problem, as even arbitration can be costly. However, a new federal workplace regime could address this issue as part of
the substantial reforms necessary to nationalize workplace law. There are
no magic bullets, but one option would be to establish workplace small
claims courts, perhaps in conjunction with the more formal specialized
workplace court. These courts could also emphasize mediation, but still
allow a judge to resolve a dispute in a short hearing that dispenses with the

238.
Cf. Robert Blackburn & Mark Hart, Employment Rights in Small Firms: Some New Evidence,
Explanations and Implications, 32 INDUS. L.J. 60, 65 (2003) (describing survey showing that British
employment statute imposed disproportionate compliance costs on small employers).
239.
This threshold would exclude approximately 11% of all firms in the United States and 5% of
all employees. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICS ABOUT BUSINESS SIZE: 2004, Table 2(a) (2007),
available at http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/smallbus.html. Policymakers could make limited
exceptions to this exclusion, such as ensuring that all employees are covered by minimum wage guarantees.
240.
See infra notes 284–285 and accompanying text; Hodges, supra note 75, at 623–24 (discussing
effectiveness of abritration as an alternative method for resolving labor claims); Morris, supra note 33,
at 499–500, 505. Mexico, for instance, gives its labor courts exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes
between employers and employees. Ziad Raymond Azar, Bankruptcy Reform in Mexico: A Study of
Old and New Insolvency Proceedings, 31 INT’L BUS. L. 131, 132 (2003); see also Guy Davidov,
Unbound: Some Comments on Israel’s Judicially-Developed Labor Law, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y
J. 283 (2009) (discussing Israel’s National Labour Court). But see James J. Brudney et al., Judicial
Hostility Towards Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1763–64 (1999) (questioning whether specialized court provides more benefits
than costs).
241.
Hirsch, supra note 99, at 124–26; see Samuel Estreicher & Zev J. Eigen, The Forum for
Adjudication of Employment Disputes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW (Michael L. Wachter & Cynthia L. Estlund, eds. forthcoming 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1656618.
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time and expense of attorney-conducted litigation.242 Although this type of
dispute resolution is not as thorough as formal litigation, it is far better
than what most low-wage employees get now—nothing.
Horizontal integration promises more effective compliance and enforcement of workplace rules. By eliminating much of the complexity that
exists in today’s workplace cases, integration can reduce the costs of employer compliance with the rules, the hurdles to employees’ understanding
of their protections, and the inefficiencies in adjudicating claims.243
D. Doomed by History?: Past Nationalization Attempts
The proposal to nationalize workplace law raises reasonable questions
about the federal government’s ability to exercise such power. A logical
focus of this inquiry is to examine two major federal workplace laws that
currently preempt most state regulations: ERISA and the NLRA.244 Neither statute is the paradigm of success, as they suffer at times from complicated statutory provisions and poor enforcement—failures that serve as
a warning about the risks of nationalizing the entire workplace law system.
Yet, such problems do not necessarily undermine the argument for nationalization. No regulatory system is without fault, so it is no surprise that
major statutes such as ERISA and the NLRA have problems. The more
important question is whether, despite their faults, ERISA and the NLRA
are superior to state regulation over their respective areas. Although impossible to determine with certainty, federal preemption in these areas
appears to be more favorable than the alternative.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act: Too Little Preemption?
Regulation of pensions and other employee benefits is a relatively new
phenomenon. Save for some isolated cases and statutes, there had been no
serious attempt to regulate employee benefits at the federal or state level
until Congress enacted ERISA in 1974.245 Policymakers realized that a
unitary national standard was needed to protect promised employee bene242.
Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 L. & SOC’Y REV. 11, 20–22 (1984).
243.
Cf. Congressman Michael A. Andrews, Tax Simplification, 47 SMU L. REV. 37, 48 (1993)
(stating that “[e]mployers, especially small employers, find it difficult to comply with the complex
laws governing pension plans for their employees. Since establishing or continuing a plan is voluntary,
this complexity deters some employers from establishing pension plans and also causes others to terminate existing plans.”).
244.
The NLRA does not apply to public employees. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006).
245.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006) (preempting “any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” regulated by ERISA). Instead of United States Code
citations, this article will refer to the original act’s sections, such as “ERISA § 514,” rather than “29
U.S.C. § 1144(a).”
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fits; thus, ERISA’s preemption of state governance was a major justification for the act.246
The problems with the regulation of employee benefit plans prior to
ERISA are a microcosm of the problems with today’s workplace laws.
Prior to ERISA, regulation of pensions and other benefits was haphazard.
For the most part, pre-ERISA employee-benefit regulation consisted of
disparate rules emanating from various state court decisions.247 The federal
government encouraged private retirement plans through tax incentives
and favorable labor law rulings that gave unions increased opportunities to
implement such plans.248 Yet, federal regulation of those plans was limited. Congress enacted several statutes that regulated various aspects of
employee benefits, but only in a piecemeal fashion.249 The result was that,
despite some limits,250 employers and unions had a significant degree of
freedom in how they established and administered plans. However, this
freedom came with costs. Employers and unions had no restrictions on the
terms they created for pension plans, nor did they have to ensure that the
promises they made were secure.251 Eradicating the inevitable abuses of
this freedom became one of the major goals of ERISA.
The incomplete patchwork of state employee-benefit rules was another
concern of Congress when it enacted ERISA and its broad preemption of
state regulation. Indeed, the legislative history surrounding ERISA’s
preemption provision explicitly emphasized the importance of centralizing
regulatory power within the federal government and avoiding disparate
state rules governing employee benefits.252
Opposition to ERISA from employers and unions had been fierce, but
quickly dissipated once the threat of increased state regulation became
246.
James Wooten has written an informative account of the history of ERISA preemption. See
James A. Wooten, A Legislative and Political History of ERISA Preemption, Part 2, 14 J. PENSION
BENEFITS 5 (2007); James A. Wooten, A Legislative and Political History of ERISA Preemption, Part
1, 14 J. PENSION BENEFITS 31 (2006); see also JAMES A WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY (2004); James D. Hutchinson & David M.
Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 23, 34–43 (1978); Edward A. Zelinsky, Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, and the
New Jurisprudence of ERISA Preemption, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 807 (1999).
247.
Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 31.
248.
Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 32.
249.
See, e.g., Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1947) (regulating union-run
employee benefit plans); Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 301 (repealed 1974)
(mandating disclosure and filing requirements for employee benefit plans).
250.
Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 32 (noting antidiscrimination and reporting requirements).
251.
Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 32.
252.
H.R. CONF. REP. NO.1280, 93d CONG., 1974 U.S.C.A.N.N. 5038, 5162 (stating that “provisions of title I are to supersede all State laws that relate to any employee benefit plan that is established
by an employer engaged in or affecting interstate commerce or by an employee organization that
represents employees engaged in or affecting interstate commerce”); 120 CONG. REC. 29,928, 29,933
(1974) (statement of Sen. Williams) (“It should be stressed that [ERISA is] . . . intended to preempt
the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and
local regulation of employee benefit plans.”); see generally Vranka, supra note 97, at 613–14.
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real.253 Although some states had begun to promulgate limited regulations
of pensions prior to ERISA’s enactment, they were the rare exceptions to
a generally laissez-faire regulatory stance.254 By the early 1970s, however,
more state courts and legislatures began considering, or actually engaging
in, pension governance.255 Groups that initially opposed federal regulation
then had a new, greater concern: the possibility of inconsistent state
pension requirements.256 That threat extended to welfare plans, which
states had also started to express an interest in regulating.257 Ultimately,
the fear of state regulation was significant enough to shift employers’ and
unions’ support.
Despite, or perhaps because of, its promise of unifying employee benefit law, ERISA has faced widespread criticism. That criticism includes
many of the problems associated with today’s workplace regulatory system, such as unnecessary complexity and ineffective enforcement.258 Yet,
even if all of those criticisms are true, ERISA is not necessarily a failure.
Indeed, the proper comparison is not ERISA’s performance vis-à-vis an
ideal framework. Rather, pragmatic policymaking should evaluate whether
ERISA does a better job protecting employee benefits than the system it
replaced or the system that would have existed if ERISA had not been
enacted. In spite of its problems, ERISA’s elimination of state authority
over employee benefits seems to have been a wise policy decision.
Many of the criticisms of ERISA are targeted to shortcomings related
to its substantive provisions.259 Those problems only serve to strengthen
the argument for preemption. It is possible that some states could have
done a better job than Congress in establishing employee benefit rules. It
is also a near-certainty, however, that some states would have done worse.
The result would be a wide variety of rules—some better, some the same,
253.
Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 34. Unions that were not primary plan administrators were
supportive of federal pension regulation. Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 33.
254.
Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 34.
255.
Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 34.
256.
Wooten, Part 2, supra note 246, at 10 (quoting legislative history); see also Wooten, Part 1,
supra note 245, at 34 (citing legislative history describing dangers of state regulation); Note, SelfInsured Employee Welfare Plans and the 501(c)(9) Trust: The Specter of State Regulation, 43 U. CIN.
L. REV. 325 (1974).
257.
Wooten, Part 2, supra note 246, at 10. “Welfare plans” refers to plans “established and
maintained by employers to provide benefit programs that include health, disability, and life insurance;
training programs; reimbursement for day care centers; scholarship funds; and prepaid legal services.”
Bales et al., supra note 196, at 199 (citing ERISA § 3(1)).
258.
Edward A. Zelinsky, The New Massachusetts Health Law: Preemption and Experimentation,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 229, 231–34 (2007) (describing ERISA preemption analysis); Edward A.
Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 476–77 (2004) (arguing that
“inflexibility, impenetrability, and administrative costs associated with ERISA’s defined benefit minimum funding rules are, for many employers, a significant deterrent to establishing or continuing
defined benefit plans, particularly when those rules are contrasted with the greater flexibility, transparency, and simplicity of the rules governing profit-sharing plans”).
259.
See supra note 258.
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and some worse than ERISA. No matter ERISA’s weaknesses, one set of
flawed regulations is far better than the multiple, often equally flawed,
regimes that would have resulted in its absence. This is all the more true
given that multi-state benefit plans would have faced regulation from numerous jurisdictions.
A further criticism of ERISA is the difficulty in interpreting its
preemption provision.260 Although one of the purposes of ERISA’s
preemption language261 was to minimize disputes over the degree to which
state actions conflict with ERISA, litigation over that issue has been significant.262 Again, taking that criticism as valid, ERISA still appears to provide a net benefit because such disputes probably impose far fewer costs
than the myriad of disparate state rules that would exist without ERISA
preemption.
Admittedly, it is virtually impossible to quantify these costs and benefits. However, it is hard to believe that the additional litigation required to
resolve preemption questions is greater than the costs associated with each
state having its own employee benefit rules.263 Indeed, one could interpret
ERISA’s experience as a failure to make its preemption strong enough, as
most questions arise because ERISA permits some state governance.264
Remove that authority and the preemption issue becomes far less troublesome.
The experience of ERISA serves as both a warning and a hope. Despite the many criticisms of ERISA preemption, the important question is
whether allowing state regulation would create a better governance system. It is impossible to predict with certainty, but Congress’s concern
about a patchwork of state laws was probably well-founded. As an aide to
Senator Javits, the prime sponsor of ERISA, warned: “if the States are to
legislate in this field . . . only chaos can result.”265 It is difficult to imagine that a multitude of state rules governing various types of pension and
260.
See supra note 258.
261.
ERISA § 514.
262.
Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 31.
263.
It is possible that an employer could simply comply with the most burdensome state regime,
but likely differences in reporting and other administrative requirements still creates unavoidable
conflicts.
264.
ERISA § 514.
265.
Wooten, Part 1, supra note 246, at 34 (quoting Private Pension Plan Reform: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1031 (1973) (statement of Frank Cummings)). Edward
Zelinsky has argued that ERISA should be amended to allow for more state experimentation with
health care regulation and that Section 514 should be repealed to “abolish altogether the jurisprudence
of ERISA preemption.” Zelinsky, New Massachusetts Health Law, supra note 258, at 233; see also
id. at 276–87. He argues for a repeal of ERISA preemption to “avoid the definitional and borderline
problems inherent in [the current] more limited exemption from ERISA preemption for state health
care laws.” Id. at 81. Nationalizing workplace law would obviate Zelinsky’s concerns by broadly
eliminating state authority over the workplace, thereby avoiding more specific questions about which
areas still retain governance authority.
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welfare plans would be a preferable solution to a comprehensive federal
approach—even one as imperfect as ERISA.
2. National Labor Relations Act v. the Ratchet Approach
The other major example of federal workplace preemption is the governance of private-sector labor law under the NLRA. The Supreme Court
has long interpreted the NLRA as having a strong preemptive effect—
albeit one that, unlike ERISA, is not explicit.266
The reasoning for providing the NLRB exclusive authority to enforce
the NLRA is the agency’s expertise, yet criticism of its performance has
been extensive.267 The NLRB’s limited remedial authority, significant delays in processing cases, and blatant politicism have all served to undermine the NLRB’s credibility and its ability to enforce the NLRA’s goals.
It is understandable, therefore, that this dissatisfaction has led some to
look to states as an alternative. However understandable, this argument is
ill-advised. Although enforcement is a serious problem, particularly after a
recent series of NLRB decisions favoring employers,268 increased state
regulation is unlikely to improve enforcement of the NLRA’s goals; indeed, it is likely to make matters worse.
Several commentators have recently argued for increased state authority of labor relations, most notably Harvard economist Richard Freeman.269
Professor Freeman asserts that state regulation will generally result in
more union protections. Yet, it seems more likely that the change would
hurt unions. To be sure, certain states such as California would move in a
266.
Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976);
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking
Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355 (1990). The
Court has recently confirmed the strength of the NLRA’s implied preemption in Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008) (holding that NLRA preempts California legislation prohibiting
employers from using state funds to deter or promote unionization).
267.
See Complaint to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association by the AFL-CIO Concerning
the United States Government’s Violations of Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining by
Failing to Enforce the National Labor Relations Act 10–41 (ILO Case No. 2608, filed Oct. 25, 2007),
available at http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/id/mamr-78btn4/$File/ILOcomplaint.pdf; Cynthia L.
Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1530–31 (2002);
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262,
268–74 (2008).
268.
See, e.g., In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (2007) (easing restrictions on decertifying
voluntarily recognized unions); Anne Marie Lofaso, September Massacre: The Latest Battle in the War
on Workers’ Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133607 (describing cases).
269.
Richard B. Freeman, Will Labor Fare Better Under State Labor Relations Laws?, in Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting, Labor & Employment Relations Association Series (2006), available
at http://www.press.uillinois.edu/journals/irra/proceedings2006/freeman.html; see also Drummonds,
supra note 228 (arguing for more state control over labor law, in part because shared state and federal
authority has long been the norm and it allows for more experimentation, flexibility, and voice);
Secunda, supra note 127 (arguing for more state authority to prohibit workplace captive audience
meetings).
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more pro-union direction.270 But many other states would implement more
pro-employer measures.271 Although Freeman argues that matters cannot
become much worse in those states, one should not underestimate the imagination of pro-employer policymakers. In areas in which the NLRA does
not apply, such as labor activity involving state employees, a large number
of states have refused to impose a duty to recognize unions or to protect
employees’ ability to engage in collective activity without employer retaliation. Indeed, many of those states have actively limited employee rights,
including one of the central federal labor protections—the right to strike.272
Arguments such as Freeman’s are shortsighted. Although the political
landscape may look bleak at times for pro-employee advocates, that landscape is almost guaranteed to change.273 The inevitable shift of political
winds should make us reticent to trap ourselves in a policy designed for a
political environment that will invariably cease to exist. Instead, we should
focus on which entity is best suited to regulate the workplace over the
long-run. Concentrating on regulatory competence may sacrifice some
desired policies in the short-term, but will likely result in a more optimal
set of workplace laws over time.274
It is true that if the singular goal was to maximize the promulgation of
employee rights,275 an alternative “ratchet” or gap-filling approach would
be best. Under this approach, federal regulation would create a minimum
floor of rights to which states could add, but not take away.276 This approach views exclusive federal authority as detrimental because it deprives
workers of the benefits of laws in more employee-friendly states such as
California.277 Although California employees would likely gain with increased state regulation, those benefits also involve costs associated with
increased complexity and inefficient enforcement—costs borne not just by
California employees, but by employees nationally.278 It is difficult, if not
270.
See, e.g., Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408.
271.
Weiler, supra note 38, at 180 (describing “right to work” laws, which allow employees to pay
no dues to a union that represents them).
272.
Martin H. Malin, Public Employees’ Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 313, 313–14 (1993) (noting that most states prohibit public employee strikes).
273.
For example, Freeman released his paper in January 2006, when the NLRB had an active proemployer majority. Months later, more union-friendly Democrats gained control of Congress. Then,
only two years later after Freeman’s paper, the Democrats controlled Congress and the White House.
274.
See supra notes 178–197 and accompanying text.
275.
Although the NLRA places employees’ right to engage in collective action as its main goal,
protecting business and the national economy are also significant aims. See Textile Workers Union of
Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965).
276.
See Sperino, supra note 200, at 354–55.
277.
Others have argued more generally that the ratchet approach may provide the best chance to
reach an optimal mix of rights by allowing the federal government to set a minimum threshold, while
permitting states to exceed that level if deemed appropriate in that jurisdiction. John O. McGinnis,
Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 485, 520 (2002).
278.
See supra, Part II.B, III.A.1.
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impossible, to determine the net result of enhanced state labor regulation;
however, benefitting employees of a few states at the expense of employees in other states seems like a poor choice.
It is ironic that attempts to reform the NLRA could introduce one of
the few problems that the act has not yet encountered. Federal labor law
has been mostly immune from the problems implicated by concurrent federal and state governance over other areas of workplace law. It would be
ill-advised to introduce such problems to the labor realm via the ratchet
approach and its additional layer of regulations. Indeed, increased complexity could hinder workers in labor-friendly states from fully enjoying
the new rights created under the ratchet approach. In contrast to focusing
on relatively well-off employees, improving enforcement of existing rights
would better ensure that workers in employer-friendly states actually receive the protections that society deems important.279
In short, enhancing protection for workers is an admirable goal, but
not if such enhancement fails to provide real benefits. The inability of our
current workplace laws to achieve their stated goals suggests that merely
adding to existing protections would deliver far less than promised. Ensuring that workplace laws actually accomplish what they say seems a more
effective path than simply concentrating on the number of laws that exist.
In addition, resisting a single-minded concern with one party’s interests is an important facet of regulatory pragmatism. Solely focusing on
expanding workers’ rights—just like a narrow concern with employer interests—is a poor way to regulate. Even policymakers sympathetic to the
need of workers must take into account other parties’ concerns. Employer
interests cannot be ignored, for generating too much employer hostility
will undermine even the best-laid plans to expand workers’ rights.280
Instead of expanding state authority in what is likely a failed attempt to
address the NLRA’s shortcomings, an opportunity exists to improve labor
law governance as part of a more expansive reformation of workplace law.
The proposed federal workplace code would address many of the current
problems with the NLRA’s enforcement. For instance, the NLRA’s anemic remedies would be replaced with the new federal code’s remedial structure, which would include compensatory and punitive damages, and possibly fines. The only monetary award currently available to the NLRB is
backpay—fines, compensatory damages, and punitive damages are not
permissible.281 Allowing these traditional damage awards, as well as fines
in cases where such damages are inappropriate,282 would eliminate em279.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 152–57 (1971) (describing “maximin” theory that social
welfare is best served by a policy that maximizes the worst, rather than the average, outcome); see
also Weil, supra note 23, at 127.
280.
Hirsch, supra note 99, at 139–42 (discussing Title VII backlash).
281.
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000); Estlund, supra note 267, at 1552.
282.
An employer’s failure to bargain with a union is an example of a serious unfair labor practice
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ployers’ ability in many cases to violate the NLRA without facing any
monetary penalty other than their own litigation costs.283
The workplace code’s improved adjudicatory system would also enhance enforcement of labor rights.284 Increased damages that would attract
more attorneys, as well as a new forum for workplace claims, would provide employees more opportunities and incentives to challenge unlawful
employer practices.
Further, adjudicating labor cases under a specialized workplace court
system would eliminate the wasted resources and inconsistent results that
can occur when disputes involve issues that fall both inside and outside of
the NLRB’s jurisdiction. For example, under current law, allegations that
an employer terminated employees because of their union activity and race
could not be adjudicated in a single proceeding. The NLRB has exclusive
authority to determine the union animus claim, but could not address the
racial discrimination claim.285 In contrast, a unified workplace court could
address all of these claims in a single proceeding.
The NLRB’s exclusive enforcement of the NLRA has been far from
perfect. Yet, permitting state governance is no solution. To the contrary, a
better option would be to strengthen federal control over labor and other
workplace regulations. Although some employees would benefit from increased state authority over labor law, far more employees would enjoy
the improved enforcement that would result from the new federal
workplace code’s reforms.
In the end, however, anecdotes about past legislative experiences have
limited persuasiveness either for or against workplace federalism. The
problem with such anecdotes is that they extrapolate the experiences of a
federalist regulatory model to a proposed national model. In other words,
the experiences under today’s system of concurrent federal and state governance have limited relevance to what would happen if states no longer
had a role in workplace governance; those experiences cannot predict what
a federal government with exclusive control would have done. A better
comparison is to other nationalized workplace regimes—a comparison that
in which damages are unavailable. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970). Similarly, even current monetary damages in termination cases—which consist solely of backpay—may be small if the
employee if able to find similar-paying work quickly. NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d
1307, 1316–17 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing interim earnings deduction).
283.
Estlund, supra note 42, at 390 (describing importance of private workplace litigation in reforming public enforcement). The workplace code’s termination rule would make a reinstatement
order more viable. See supra note 99 and accompanying text; Hirsch, supra note 99, at 145 (explaining that unjust dismissal protection counters the fact that most employees do not stay long after returning pursuant to a reinstatement order).
284.
See supra notes 240–242 and accompanying text.
285.
Similarly, a termination may raise possible violations of both the NLRA and a collectivebargaining agreement. The NLRB has sole authority to find NLRA violations, while federal courts
have sole jurisdiction over claims alleging breaches of collective-bargaining agreements. 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (2000); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985).
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suggests that a nationalized system would not be ruinous and would instead likely produce a more efficient and effective system of workplace
rules.286
IV. CONCLUSION
Our current workplace regulatory scheme is broken. It consists of an
unnecessarily confusing and ineffective patchwork of laws that often
leaves workers with little more than empty promises. A problem of this
significance warrants an equally significant solution—the nationalization of
workplace law.
Much of the problem with today’s workplace laws is that they have
developed virtually independent of each other. With few exceptions, these
laws were implemented by federal or state governments at various points
in time as a response to an immediate policy concern. That regulatory
approach can be appropriate, but it raises the possibility—one that has
repeatedly been realized in the workplace context—that policymakers will
fail to consider each new law’s interaction with the existing framework.
The aggregate effect is a broad system of laws that ultimately collapses
under the weight of its own complexity.
This complexity inhibits parties’ understanding of workplace rules, as
well as attempts to enforce them. For instance, voluntary compliance is a
central goal of most workplace laws, yet even good faith employers face
significant costs in trying to understand and follow all of the relevant requirements. Employers’ difficulties in understanding the multitude of
complicated workplace rules is dwarfed by the problems encountered by
employees, who have far less time, resources, and knowledge than their
employers. This information problem cripples employees’ ability both to
understand what rights they possess and to seek enforcement even when
they are aware of unlawful activity. Enforcement of workplace protections
is no better, as a single set of facts can produce multiple claims, under
multiple jurisdictions, and in multiple forums. Given these problems, it is
no surprise that most workplace laws have been a disappointment.
This complex and inefficient system of workplace laws is suboptimal,
as there are many reforms that could produce far more benefits than costs.
Because the shortcomings of this system are so severe, what is needed
most is a radically new approach to workplace regulation. Policymakers
should use a more pragmatic method that would consider how all of the
various workplace laws fit together and what is needed to make their enforcement more effective. The proposed nationalization of workplace law
would be a broad culmination of such an approach.
286.

See supra note 6.
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The nationalized federal workplace code would achieve more effective
compliance and enforcement through a dramatic simplification of existing
rules. It would vertically integrate those rules by completely replacing
state authority over the workplace with exclusive federal control. The code
would also horizontally integrate workplace rules by consolidating requirements where possible, simplifying rules that must stand on their own,
and implementing a unified enforcement and administrative scheme. The
result would be a new workplace regulatory system that is far easier to
understand, to follow, and to enforce than existing law.
Nationalization is no panacea, of course, as it could end up imposing
more costs than benefits. However, even if policymakers are too wary to
enact this ambitious reform, any attempt to engage in more pragmatic decision making would move workplace regulation closer to its optimal level. Seemingly small improvements, such as consolidating certain federal
and state claims, reducing disparate enforcement requirements, and making more consistent definitions across various laws would produce substantial gains. In contrast, policymakers’ continued refusal to recognize that
the goals of today’s workplace laws are collapsing under their own weight
threatens to accelerate that disturbing trend. It is only by comprehensively
and pragmatically addressing these problems that our system of workplace
laws will deliver on its many promises.

